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1. Introduction: Setting the Stage 
“Although obviously there were resistance and setbacks, as in China in 1989, the movement to-
ward democracy seemed to take on the character of an almost irresistible global tide moving 
from one triumph to the next”. –Samuel P. Huntington (1991: 21).
1.1. The State of Democratization in the Post-Cold War Period
The end of the Cold War and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 were, 
according to some observers, to herald “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the 
“total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism”.1 Portugal’s Carnation Rev-
olution in April 1974 signified the starting point of what Samuel P. Huntington would come to refer 
to as the third-wave of democratization.2 Following the military coup and revolution in Portugal, 
transitions away from autocracy spread and would subsequently take place throughout Southern 
Europe, South America and CEE. Extrapolating these initial successful transitions to democracy, it 
was assumed that similar processes would inevitably take hold in the post-Soviet space and else-
where, leading to similar outcomes and improvements in democratic performance. Steven Lev-
itsky and Lucan Way sum up the initial optimism and teleological mindset of some observers re-
garding the future success of the third-wave of democratization in the post-Soviet space as follows: 
The tendency to conflate authoritarian crisis and democratic transition was powerfully rein-
forced by the demise of communism. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the So-
viet Union generated a widespread perception that liberal democracy was ‘the only game 
in town.’ Because all roads lead to democracy, observers began to interpret all regime crises 
as incipient democratic transition.3
The exuberant optimism regarding the further spread of liberal democracy has been significant-
ly dialed back in recent years and has given way to increasingly pessimistic viewpoints in light of 
the perceived stagnation of democratization around the world.4 Recent world events have added 
to the pessimism, including the re-emergence and assertiveness of China, Iran, Russia and oth-
er regional authoritarian powers5, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and hybrid war in Ukraine’s Don-
1 Fukuyama 1989: 3.
2 See: Huntington 1991. 
3 Levitsky and Way 2015: 49. 
4 As Francis Fukuyama points out, “there has been a democratic recession since 2006, with a decline in aggregate 
Freedom House scores every year since then” (Fukuyama 2015: 11). 
5 Regarding the new assertiveness of authoritarian governments worldwide, Arch Puddington, the vice president of 
research at Freedom House, grimly notes: “Until recently, most authoritarian regimes claimed to respect interna-
tional agreements and paid lip service to the norms of competitive elections and human rights. They now increa-
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bass region, the descent of the “Arab Spring” into war and chaos, as well as protracted economic 
crises among the world’s leading democratic powers.6 Some observers have begun to speak of a 
democratic recession and rollback while others have even proclaimed the current era of demo-
cratic transition to have reached its end.7 In stark contrast to his earlier positions, the darkening 
horizons of the current international system have also led Francis Fukuyama to question wheth-
er “we are experiencing a momentary setback in a general movement towards greater democra-
cy around the world […] or whether the events of this year [2014] signal a broader shift in world 
politics and the rise of serious alternatives to democracy”.8 
1.2. The State of Democratization in CEE and the Post-Soviet Space
While post-communist states in CEE have largely transitioned in accordance with the initial opti-
mistic predictions of democratization and transition scholars,9 outcomes in the states that make 
up the former Soviet Union have taken divergent courses. Initial authoritarian openings led many 
observers in the early 1990s to see the beginnings of a transition to democracy. However, a more 
chaotic, liberal order turned out to be the de facto setting of many post-Soviet regimes coping with 
new challenges and unpredictable domestic and international environments, and in some cases 
civil war (Georgia and Tajikistan), interstate conflicts (Armenia and Azerbaijan) or armed separat-
ism (Russia, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan). 
The competitive nature of Russian politics during this period is representative of much of the broad-
er region. Russia’s more liberal initial post-Soviet development was, in fact, due less to improved 
democratic performance and democracy taking root than the fact that President Boris Yeltsin “pre-
sided over a state in disarray, which left him unable to control his own security forces, bureaucracy, 
and regional governments”.10 According to Freedom House’s annual survey Freedom in the World, 
five out of the seven (non-Baltic) post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus 
were hybrid regimes11 at the onset of the 2000s, while Belarus and Azerbaijan were considered 
autocracies. At this point, improvements in democratic performances had failed to materialize in 
the region, in stark contrast to CEE.12 
singly flout democratic values, argue for the superiority of what amounts to one-party rule, and seek to throw off 
the constraints of fundamental diplomatic principles” (Puddington 2015: 123). 
6 Cf. Plattner 2014: 14. 
7 See: Diamond 2008, Plattner 2014. 
8 Fukuyama 2015: 11. 
9 Serious concerns have been raised regarding democratic backsliding in CEE countries such as Hungary under the 
national conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, as well as in Romania under former Prime Minister Victor Ponta 
(See: Müller 2013; Iusmen 2015).
10 Levitsky and Way 2015: 51. 
11 Describing states which find themselves in the grey area between the ideal types of democracy and autocracy, Tho-
mas Carothers writes that they exhibit “some attributes of democratic political life, including at least limited politi-
cal space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitu-
tions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic deficits” (Carothers 2002: 9). 
12 The divergences in Europe’s post-communist states were becoming strikingly evident throughout the 1990s. Com-
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In the first half of the 2000s, a series of “Colored Revolutions” occurred in several post-Soviet states, 
namely Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), and bolstered hopes of renewed 
movement towards democracy in the region. These events also led to a vigorous debate regard-
ing the underlying causes of the mass mobilizations and their meaning for democratization in the 
region.13 Some observers viewed these events as genuine democratic breakthroughs, while others 
interpreted them as a form of succession crisis among elites, typical to semi-authoritarian, hybrid 
regimes.14 After the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, no further colored revolutions took 
place in the post-Soviet space. The colored revolutions would end up having the inadvertent ef-
fect of unleashing an autocratic counter-reaction in the region among incumbent leaders wish-
ing to prevent similar occurrences in their countries, along with the strengthening of Russia’s re-
newed aspirations to regional hegemony. 
For the post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus15, the focus of this study, 
successes comparable to CEE or the Baltic States in terms of improved democratic performance 
and political and economic transformations would not be subsequently achieved. As Grzegorz Eki-
ert et al. point out, transitions away from autocracy in the region “have either lost their momentum 
and resulted in partially democratic systems or have been reversed and brought new authoritari-
an regimes”.16 The empirical data bears out this assessment. Over the period 1993-2014, Freedom 
House has measured improvements in political rights and civil liberties in just three post-Soviet 
countries, namely Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These three states, however, have yet to breach 
the threshold of consolidated democracies and continue to occupy the “grey zone” between de-
mocracy and autocracy. Belarus and Russia, on the other hand, have gone in the opposite direc-
tion, regressing from hybrid regimes to increasingly authoritarian political systems, while Azerbai-
jan has maintained a hereditary autocracy throughout the entire period in question. Armenia has 
also seen deteriorations in both its political rights and civil liberties. What factors can account for 
the drastically differing outcomes regarding democratic performance and transition in CEE and 
the post-Soviet states on Europe’s eastern periphery? 
1.3. Research Question 
In order to address this puzzle, this study will focus on developments in the post-Soviet states in 
Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus since gaining independence in the early 1990s. The 
paring CEE to the FSU, Ekiert et al. write that the new CEE EU member states had “introduced comprehensive reforms 
overhauling their states, economies, and welfare systems; they are wealthier with faster-growing economies and lower 
levels of income disparity; and they benefit from liberal democratic standards safeguarded by a consolidated democrat-
ic system” (Ekiert et al. 2007: 8f). 
13 See: Hale 2005; McFaul 2007; Way 2008; Stykow 2010. 
14 Cf. Stykow 2010: 139-47.
15 The states to be considered here are: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Southern Caucasus, as well as Belarus, 
Ukraine and Moldova in Eastern Europe. 
16 Ekiert et al. 2007: 7.
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research question this study will investigate is as follows: 
Why have some post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus achieved only mod-
est gains in democratic performance since independence, while others have stagnated or undergone 
authoritarian regressions? 
While pursuing the research question, the effects of both internal and external structural factors 
on the democratic performances of the above-mentioned post-Soviet states will be examined. 
The structural factors to be tested as independent variables include the effects of energy rents 
and rentierism on a respective country’s democratic performance, as well as the role external ac-
tors - in this case, Russia - have played in shaping these post-Soviet countries’ political trajectories 
through the instrumentalization of political, economic and military leverages and the exertion of 
outside pressure.
1.4. Relevance of the Research Question
With Russia’s invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, Europe witnessed 
the first forcible change to its borders since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The imme-
diate underlying reasons for Russia’s military interventions in Crimea and Donbas have to do with 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania in November 2013. Then Ukrainian Presi-
dent Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) unexpectedly refused to sign an Association Agreement with 
the EU at the summit, opting for closer economic integration with Russia. This in turn sparked what 
would become known as the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), which culminated in snipers kill-
ing more than 100 protestors in Kyiv17 and Yanukovych fleeing his post first to eastern Ukraine 
and eventually to Russia in February 2014. Russia’s military response followed shortly thereafter. 
Considering this ongoing episode from a broader perspective, the underlying causes of the tur-
moil engulfing parts of Ukraine in the EU’s eastern neighborhood (as well in its southern neigh-
borhood) are connected to issues of good governance, or rather the lack thereof. Describing the 
Euromaidan protestors’ motivation for taking to the streets to demonstrate following the Vilnius 
summit, Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk write the following: 
Even though very few protestors were actually familiar with the content of the Association 
Agreement, for them Europe symbolized democracy, human rights, and the rule of law – 
precisely the principles sorely lacking in Ukraine under Yanukovych. For the protestors, mo-
ving closer to Russia offered more of the same: deteriorating democratic standards and go-
vernance, suppression of the opposition, media, civil society, and corruption.18
17 Cf. RFE/RL 2015a: ‘Ukraine marks anniversary of Maidan massacre’ <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-maidan-an-
niversary/26860006.html> (Accessed 02.05.2015).
18 Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 471. 
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Francis Fukuyama, for his part, views the struggle for better governance in the post-Soviet region 
in terms of the conflict between modern forms of governance and neopatrimonial19 political or-
ders. In this sense, “the real choice facing the people in this region is […] whether their societies 
are to be based on governments seeking to serve the public interest in an impersonal manner, or 
are to be ruled by a corrupt coalition of elites who seek to use the state as a route to personal en-
richment”.20 The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), developed prior to the union’s east-
ern enlargements in 2004 and 2007, was designed to deal expressly with these issues of stability, 
good governance and increased integration in Europe’s eastern and southern neighborhoods.21 
As the EU correctly recognized prior to enlargement, non-democratic governance, instability and 
armed conflicts in the union’s eastern and southern peripheries represented not only threats to 
these regions themselves, but also to the EU and countries further afield. This was made evident 
with the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 on July 17, 2014 over occupied territory 
in eastern Ukraine. Among the 289 victims, 193 were Dutch citizens.22 The proliferation of interna-
tional terrorist organizations, armed conflicts, lawlessness and an unprecedented wave of migra-
tion from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe23 also serve to illustrate the ultimate failures 
of non-democratic governance in Europe’s southern neighborhood, along with its far-reaching 
consequences.  
It is in this context that the importance of investigating both the internal and external structural 
factors which serve to diminish a country’s democratic performance becomes most evident. Com-
menting on the advantages versus the disadvantages of democratic governance, Larry Diamond 
concludes that the open nature of democratic societies “logically make them much more likely 
than authoritarian regimes to honor their obligations under international law and treaties”.24 On 
the other hand, referring to the nature of authoritarian rule, Diamond quotes former United Na-
tions Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and writes that the “dubious legitimacy of author-
itarian regimes make them ‘more likely to incite hostilities against other States in order to justify 
their suppression of internal dissent or forge a basis for national unity”.25 Indeed, some observers 
contribute Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, as well as its increasingly belligerent stance towards 
19 Fukuyama describes neopatrimonial political orders as states pretending “to be modern polities, but these in fact 
constitute rent-sharing kleptocracies run for the private benefit of the insiders” (Fukuyama 2015: 13). 
20 Fukuyama 2015: 15. 
21 In its 2004 strategy paper on the ENP, the European Commission writes: “The European Neighbourhood Policy’s vi-
sion involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly 
close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integrati-
on. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well being” (European 
Commission 2004: 5).  
22 See: Coalson 2015: ‘MH17 downing: One tragedy, one truth, but many stories’, <http://www.rferl.org/content/rus-
sia-ukraine-mh17-conspiracy-theories/27132875.html> (accessed 20.07.2015). 
23 See: Kern (2015): ‘Europe’s great migration crisis’ < http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6146/europe-migration> (Ac-
cessed 20.07.2015).
24 Diamond 1999: 5.
25 Ibid. 
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the USA and the EU, to exactly these deficits in its increasingly authoritarian political regime.26 
In addition to the significant real world implications of low democratic performance outlined 
above, this study’s focus on cases where democratization has been only partially accomplished 
or where the progress made towards economic and political transitions has been completely re-
versed is relevant to obtaining a more nuanced understanding of the processes of democratiza-
tion. Elaborating on this point, Thomas Ambrosio writes that “democratization theory tends to ‘se-
lect on the dependent variable’, in that it concentrates on successes rather than failures. In other 
words, the traditional focus has been on the positive progress of democracy, rather than those 
forces which strengthen or advance autocracy”.27 In this sense, this study can further the goal of 
obtaining a fuller picture of democratization processes and the forces which further progress to-
wards more democratic governance, and those structural factors which ultimately hinder these 
processes from moving forward. 
1.5. Methodology and Case Selection
The goal of this study is to investigate the internal and external structural factors which have influ-
enced the democratic performance of post-Soviet states in both Eastern Europe and the Southern 
Caucasus. In this regard, a small-N, qualitative research design will be implemented using positiv-
ist methods. The positivist approach has its origins in the philosophy of science known as “logi-
cal positivism”, which sees the methods employed by the natural sciences as the only legitimate 
way of carrying out scientific investigation.28 As Allen Lee notes, “only by applying the methods of 
natural science, according to the positivist school of thought, will social science […] ever be able 
to match the achievements of natural science in explanation, prediction, and control”.29 Wheth-
er or not the same degree of maturity and sophistication achieved by the natural sciences can in 
fact be realized when dealing with the complex realities of social phenomena remains unclear.30
There are several important assumptions underlying the positivist approach to scientific investi-
gation and the observer’s relationship to empirical reality. Positivist ontology presupposes, for ex-
ample, “the existence of a reality independent of the observer, consisting of law-like regularities”, 
whereas its epistemology “claims the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge of the reality, 
focuses on the explanation of these regularities through the construction of theoretical general-
26 Analyzing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s current foreign policy posture, the Russian political scientist Lilia 
Shevtsova writes: “What made Russia return to the role of the ‘anti-West’? […] I would argue that this shift was pre-
ordained by Russia’s failure to use its defeat in the Cold War to transform itself into a rule-of-law state […] The lea-
der’s turn toward provocation and war as expedients for survival tells us that the system has exhausted its stabili-
ty-maintenance mechanisms” (Shevtsova 2015: 33f ). 
27 Ambrosio 2010: 376. 
28 Cf. Lee 1991: 343. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Cf. Lee 1991: 343. 
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izations, and provides criteria for theory valuation”.31 Theories are regarded as general statements 
containing a causal law or hypothesis which explains the causes or effects of specific observable so-
cial phenomena, and the possibility for falsification must exist.32 Hypotheses, for their part, lay out 
the causal relationships between specific phenomena in the form of independent and dependent 
variables, the latter being the caused phenomenon, while the former is the causing phenomenon.33 
Employing this methodological approach, this study’s research design will test two independent 
variables (IV) which have been drawn from the relevant theoretical research on democratization in 
the post-Soviet space. The case selection will take place on the side of the IVs. The two cases which 
show the greatest levels of variance will be selected in order to test the IVs effect on the depen-
dent variable (DV), namely the respective country’s democratic performance. For IV 1, the amount 
of energy rents, the cases Azerbaijan and Moldova have been selected. The cases Georgia and Azer-
baijan have been chosen for IV2, the degree of Russian external leverage. For a more detailed de-
scription of the selected cases, section 4 below will offer an outline of this study’s research design 
as well as the conceptualization and operationalization of the two independent variables and the 
study’s case selection. The timeframe of this study will range from 1993 to 2014, in order to cap-
ture the respective country’s political development since having gained independence. 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the study will consist of six chapters in total. As a starting point for this thesis, 
the following chapter will begin with a look at the key concepts of democracy and democratiza-
tion. A definition and conceptualization of what democracy is will then be delineated, along with 
its embedding in the greater theoretical discussion of political transition, in general, and in the 
post-Soviet space, in particular. The conceptualization and the operationalization of the study’s DV, 
democratic performance, will then be outlined. Chapter 3 will focus in on the study’s theoretical 
underpinning. First, key terms to be used through the study will be defined. Second, an overview 
of the evolution of the scholarly debate of democratization will be outlined. Finally, the theoreti-
cal underpinning of the study’s two IVs will be specified, along with key features and concepts of 
the arguments. In Chapter 4, the research design which serves as the foundation of this study will 
be presented and explained. This will include the conceptualization and operationalization of the 
study’s two IVs, as well as the selection of the cases to be used in the empirical test of the study’s 
hypotheses. The empirical test will then take place in Chapter 5. First, the empirical data for the 
dependent variable will be presented along with an overview of the democratic performance of 
the chosen cases. Next, the empirical data for the study’s two IVs will be laid out. The results of 
31 Kudenko 2000: 25
32 Cf. Van Era 1997: 7-12.
33 Cf. Ibid. 
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the empirical test will be summarized and analyzed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the study will con-
clude with a brief overview of the results of the empirical test, along with a critical evaluation of 
the study’s successes and shortcomings, along with prospects for future studies. 
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2. Democracy and its Measurement 
This study’s DV, namely the degree of democratic performance, has its theoretical basis in the aca-
demic discussions regarding political transition and regime change in the post-Cold War political 
environment. In the following sections, a precise definition of the basic building block of demo-
cratic performance, namely democracy at the nation state level, will be delineated. Once this has 
been accomplished, the conceptualization and operationalization of the DV will follow.
2.1. Democracy: What is it? 
Whereas democracy as a form of governance can be traced back as far as ancient Greece, the more 
modern usage of the term came into being towards the end of the 18th century, in the context of 
the American and French Revolutions. Around the middle of the 20th century, democratic theo-
rists were torn between two competing approaches – one was considered the “classical theory of 
democracy” and was primarily concerned with the sources and purposes (i.e. the will of the people 
and the common good, respectively) of democratic rule.34 However, after the publication of Joseph 
Schumpeter’s renowned study Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in 1943, a new compel-
ling approach emerged and the theoretical focus shifted away from the maximalist and normati-
ve sources and purposes of democracy, towards a more minimalist procedural understanding of 
democratic governance. Schumpeter’s new democratic method defined democracy as the “insti-
tutional arrangement for arriving at a political decision in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.35 
Schumpeter’s minimalist definition of democracy and his primary focus on competitive elections 
was further developed and elaborated upon by Robert Dahl in his seminal 1971 publication Poly-
archy: Participation and Opposition. Dahl’s conception of democracy, or polyarchy36 as he puts 
it, consists of two overt dimensions, and one implied dimension, and is also in line with Schum-
peter’s procedural and minimalist approach to democratic governance. Polyarchy’s two overt di-
mensions are opposition and participation, as the book’s title suggests; opposition entails organi-
zed contestation through free, fair and regularly occurring elections, while participation consists of 
near universal adult suffrage and the ability to run for office. The third, implied, dimension is civil 
liberty, which, according to Larry Diamond, encompasses the “freedom to speak and publish dis-
senting views, freedom to form and join organizations, and alternative sources of information”.37 In 
this sense, Dahl successfully expands his conception of democracy beyond Schumpeter’s parsimo-
34 Cf. Huntington 1991: 6. 
35 Schumpeter 1943 (2003): 269.
36 Dahl defines polyarchy as “relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes that have been substantially popu-
larized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (Dahl 1971: 8). 
37 Diamond 1999: 8. 
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nious focus on free and fair elections and incorporates important elements of civic democratic life. 
In order for the three dimensions of polyarchy to be realized in a nation state with a large popula-
tion, Dahl additionally specifies eight requirements which must exist: 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations; 
2. Freedom of expression; 
3. Right to vote; 
4. Eligibility for public office; 
5. Rights of political leaders to compete for support;
6. Alternative source of information; 
7. Free and fair elections; 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference.38 
Commenting on Schumpeter’s procedural foundation and Dahl’s expansion thereof, Samuel Hun-
tington points out the advantages of these two conceptions of democracy in that they “make it 
possible to judge to what extent political systems are democratic, to compare systems, and to an-
alyze whether systems are becoming more or less democratic”.39 
The minimalist and procedural definitions of democracy laid out by Schumpeter and Dahl will serve 
as the basis for this study’s conception of democracy. The “midrange”40 definition offered by Lev-
itsky and Way will be adopted, which is based on the consensus of a procedural approach to de-
mocracy and consists of four specific attributes, namely: (1) “free, fair, and competitive elections; 
(2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and 
association; and (4) the absence of nonelected ‘tutelary’ authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or 
religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ power to govern”.41 With this definition, Levitsky and 
Way have expanded upon Dahl’s three dimensions by addressing the issue of reserved domains 
which can undermine the scope of action and the legitimacy exercised by democratically elect-
ed and legitimate political actors. 
38 Dahl 1971: 3. 
39 Huntington 1991: 7. 
40 As Larry Diamond explains, a “midrange” conception of democracy distinguishes itself from a minimal definition ba-
sed on the question as to whether “freedoms are relevant mainly to the extent that they ensure meaningful electo-
ral competition and participation or whether they are, instead, viewed as necessary for a wider range of democratic 
functions” (Diamond 1999: 13). 
41 Levitsky and Way 2010: 6. 
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2.2. Conceptualization of the DV – Democratic Performance
Now that a definition for democracy has been established, the next step will be to review how de-
mocracies themselves are classified into differing types and subtypes, as well as how democracy 
is measured. The relevant scholarly literature offers a myriad of competing definitions and concep-
tualizations of democracy. Ariel C. Armony and Hector E. Schamis have written of “a Babel in de-
mocratization studies”.42 Larry Diamond has noted that “so serious is the conceptual disarray that 
more than 550 subtypes of democracy are identified in David Collier and Steven Levitsky’s review 
of some 150 (mostly recent) studies”.43 
When classifying different types and subtypes of democracies, Collier and Levitsky point to Giovan-
ni Sartori and his “ladder of generality”.44 The ladder is “based on a pattern of inverse variation be-
tween the number of defining attributes and number of cases. Thus, concepts with fewer attributes 
commonly apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of generality, whereas con-
cepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and hence are lower on the ladder”.45 In 
this sense, moving down the ladder of generality when dealing with the root concept of democ-
racy can lead to a more precise understanding of different types of democracy as well as greater 
differentiation. The increased conceptual differentiation provides “the more fine-grained distinc-
tions that for some purposes are invaluable to the researcher”.46 However, if a subtype of democ-
racy created by moving down the ladder of generality is not fully a democracy, this can lead to 
conceptual stretching47 and may not be appropriate. One solution to this problem is the creation 
of diminished subtypes, such as “delegative” or “illiberal” democracy. 
An example of such conceptual differentiation when dealing with the root concept of democracy 
is the distinction made between a liberal democracy and an electoral democracy. The concept of 
an electoral democracy is based upon the minimalist understanding of democracy, which is, to a 
certain extent, conflated with the holding of elections. As Larry Diamond comments, an elector-
al democracy is “a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive of-
fices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage”.48 Such 
definitions, however, neglect vital factors which are fundamental to the functioning of a demo-
cratic state, such as civil liberties, for example. Phillip C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl refer to this 
understanding of democracy as the “electoral fallacy” and comment that “however central to de-
mocracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly ag-
gregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can, especially in the early stages of a dem-
42 See Armony and Schamis 2005. 
43 Diamond 1999: 7. 
44 See: Sartori 1970.
45 Collier and Levitsky 1997: 434. 
46 Ibid. 435.
47 Conceptual stretching is referred to as “the distortion which occurs when a concept does not fit the new cases” (Col-
lier and Mahon, Jr. 1993: 845). 
48 Diamond 1999: 10. 
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ocratic transition, proliferate in a bewildering variety”.49 Wolfgang Merkel has been equally critical 
of the concept of electoral democracy and minimalist definitions in general. According to Merkel, 
this particular conceptualization is responsible for overly optimistic application of democracy to 
regimes not deserving of the label after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, “the optimism of 
transition analyses in the political science activities of these years was also, above all, an artefact 
of the conceptual minimalization of democracy, the neglect of structural impediments, and a vol-
untarization of the political agency to shape historical events and trajectories”.50
There is also a certain degree of conceptual ambiguity as to where, for example, an electoral de-
mocracy ends and an “electoral” or “competitive” authoritarian regime begins.51 Several different 
strategies have been developed to attempt to reconcile the conceptual difficulties around hybrid 
regimes, which fall somewhere between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. These range 
from referring to hybrid regimes as diminished forms of democracy, such as Diamond’s concept 
of electoral democracy, to developing diminished subtypes of authoritarianism, such as Levitsky 
and Ways concept of competitive authoritarianism.52 Freedom House, on the other hand, has opt-
ed to employ the term “partly free” to cover such political systems.  
In contrast to the diminished subtype of electoral democracy, a liberal democracy is one that is 
more expansive and differentiated than its minimalist counterpart, and is more in line with the 
conceptualizations offered by Dahl and Levitsky and Way. Liberal democracy’s conceptualization 
incorporates, for example, the rule of law, the absence of reserved domains, vertical and horizontal 
accountability for office holders as well as civil and political pluralism for individuals and groups.53 
In its annual survey Freedom in the World, FH makes a similar distinction between an electoral de-
mocracy and a liberal democracy. Regarding its methodology, FH notes that its “term ‘electoral 
democracy’ differs from ‘liberal democracy’ in that the latter also implies the presence of a sub-
stantial array of civil liberties. In Freedom in the World, all Free countries can be considered both 
electoral and liberal democracies, while some Partly Free countries qualify as electoral, but not lib-
eral, democracies.”54
In order to measure the democratic performance of a particular post-Soviet country, this study will 
base its evaluations primarily on the rating system employed by FH in its Freedom in the World sur-
vey. FH’s conceptualization of a liberal democracy will serve as this study’s benchmark for a high 
49 Schmitter and Karl 1991: 78. 
50 Merkel 2010: 19f. 
51 In this regard, Collier and Levitsky comment that “diminished subtypes are useful for characterizing hybrid regimes, 
but they raise the issue of whether these regimes should in fact be treated as subtypes of democracy, rather than 
subtypes of authoritarianism or some other concept” (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 450). 
52 Broadly describing the differences between full authoritarian, democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes, 
Levitsky and Way explain that “whereas full authoritarian regimes are characterized by the absence of competition 
(and, hence, of uncertainty) and democracy is characterized by fair competition, competitive authoritarianism is 
marked by competition that is real but unfair [….] Yet such unfairness does not preclude serious contestation – or 
even occasional opposition victories” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 12). 
53 Cf. Diamond 1999: 10f. 
54 Freedom House 2015b: 3. 
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level of democratic performance, as it is consistent with the criteria laid out by Levitsky and Way’s 
mid-range definition of democracy. This is made clear by the survey’s two areas of focus, namely 
political rights and civil liberties. A more detailed description of the DV’s operationalization will 
be presented in section 2.3 below. 
2.3. Operationalization of the DV – Democratic Performance
The operationalization of the DV will be based upon the variable’s mid-range definition as well as 
the conceptualization of a liberal democracy outlined in the previous two sections. As mentioned 
above, the assessment of a country’s democratic performance will be based upon a country’s av-
erage of their “political rights” and “civil liberties” ratings from FH’s Freedom in the World survey. 
FH is an American NGO and was founded in 1941 in Washington, D.C., USA. FH describes itself on its 
website as “an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around 
the world”.55  FH’s annual Freedom in the World survey began in the 1950s as the Balance Sheet of 
Freedom. Over the course of the ensuing decades, it continued to develop in terms of both scope 
as well as methodological sophistication and made its first appearance in book form as Freedom 
in the World in 1978. FH offers data for “political rights” and “civil liberties” dating back to 1972. Re-
garding FH’s relationship with the United States Government (USG), The Economist writes that FH 
does not “conceal its financial ties to the American government, which supplies 80% of its income. 
But it strongly denies that it acts as an arm of the government, or that it holds back from criticiz-
ing America and its friends”.56
Indicators for DV: 
• “Political rights” and “civil liberties” from FH’s Freedom in the World Survey
Freedom in the World’s rating system is based on a three-tiered approach, consisting of scores, rat-
ings and statuses. The indicator “political rights” (PR) consists of ten different sub-indicators which 
are grouped into four different subcategories, namely: electoral process, political pluralism and par-
ticipation, and the functioning of government. “Civil liberties” (CL) consists of 15 separate sub-in-
dicators, grouped into four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and or-
ganizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights. PR can be awarded 
a total of 40 points, while CL can be given up to 60, leaving 100 points as the best possible score a 
particular country or territory can receive. Regarding changes in a particular country’s score form 
year to year, FH notes that “the scores from the previous edition are used as a benchmark for the 
current year under review. A score is typically changed only if there has been a real-world devel-
opment during the year that warrants a decline or improvement (e.g., a crackdown on the media, 
55 Freedom House (2015d): ‘About US’ <https://freedomhouse.org/about-us#.VZ3JOvntmko> (Accessed 09.07.2015). 
56 The Economist 2008: ‘When freedom stumbles’ <http://www.economist.com/node/10534384> (Accessed 
09.07.2015). 
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the country’s first free and fair elections)”.57
After the score has been established, both PR and CL are assigned a rating based on the country’s 
total score. The ratings rank from “1” to “7”, with “1” being the best possible score and “7” being the 
worst, i.e. no political rights or civil liberties, respectively. The scores and the ratings are broken 
down below in Tables 1 and 2: 
                  
In order to determine a country’s status for a particular year, the PR and CL ratings are averaged 
together to come up with a combined rating. The status ranges from “1”, which is considered “free”, 
to “7”, categorized as “not free”. For clarity and a more intuitive depiction of a country’s democratic 
performance, FH’s status scale will be reversed, so that a lower score will represent a lower dem-
ocratic performance, and vice versa. The exact breakdown of the country’s assigned status is de-
picted below in Table 3.
Table 3: Democracy Rating and Status
57 Freedom House 2015b: 3. 
Table 1: Political Rights Table 2: Civil Liberties
Table 1: Political Rights
Table 2: Civil Liberties
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According to Larry Diamond, “the ‘free’ rating of the Freedom House survey is the best available 
empirical indicator of liberal democracy”.58 Diamond goes on to further elaborate on the tangible 
differences between the ratings “free” and “partly free”. Pertaining to the difference between a 5.0 
and 5.5 rating in PR, which is the cutoff point between a liberal and an electoral democracy, Di-
amond notes that “a [5.0] indicates significantly more military influence in politics, electoral and 
political violence, or electoral irregularities – and thus political contestation that is far appreciab-
ly less free, fair, inclusive, and meaningful”.59 Similar distinctions are also discernable in the CL ra-
tings. Though establishing cutoff points between conceptual distinctions is always a more or less 
arbitrary undertaking, given the nuanced differentiation present in FH’s rating system, it will ser-
ves as a useful measure of the democratic performance of post-Soviet states in this study.
In the following section, the study’s theoretical basis will be presented. The distinctions between 
the terms “transformation” and “transition” will be presented, along with a definition of democra-
tization and other key terms. After these terms have been clarified, an overview of the scholarly 
debate on democratization processes will be laid out, along with a summary of the current state 
of research on democratization in the post-Soviet space.  It is from this theoretical basis that the 
study’s two IVs will be derived. Finally, the theoretical basis of IV 1 and IV 2 will be explored.
58 Diamond 1999: 12.
59 Ibid. 12f. 
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3. Theoretical Basis: Transition and Democratization in the 
Post-Soviet Space
In their seminal 1986 work Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O’Donnell and Phil-
lipe C. Schmitter observe the following regarding a common obstacle confronting all who under-
take scientific investigation: “one major difficulty confronting our collective effort [is] to create a 
common language for inquiry among scholars rather heterogeneous background”.60 In this sense, 
the following section will establish definitions for terms which will be used throughout the remain-
der of this work, including regime, transition and democratization. 
3.1. Defining Key Terms: Regime, Transition and Democratization
When examining questions of transition, it is important to specify the level the transition is taking 
place on. Drawing upon Robert Fishman’s article ‘Rethinking state and regime’61, Wolfgang Merkel 
identifies four distinct levels of political organization which need to be considered, namely: the 
levels of system, state, regime and government.62
Figure 1: Levels of Political Organization
Commenting on the importance of understanding the level of political change that is taking pla-
ce in a situation of democratization, Robert Fishman states that particular level “is important for 
not only identifying the source of the democratic initiative, but also for understanding the sub-
60 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 6. 
61 See: Fishman 1990. 
62 Cf. Merkel 1999: 70-4.
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sequent trajectory of political change”.63 As Figure 1 illustrates, the level of system is the highest 
level and the remaining three levels, regime, state and government, are contained within it. The 
system level consists of at least four different subsystems, namely politics, economics, society and 
culture.64 As Wolfgang Merkel notes, whereas political transition processes in Latin America and 
Southern Europe took place primarily at the political level, transition in CEE took place, and are 
still taking place, contemporaneously at the political, economic levels, as well as at the societal le-
vels, in terms of mentalities.65 
More important for this study is the level of regime. The regime level can be thought of as “the for-
mal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader 
society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power 
deal with those who are not”.66 If a regime type becomes institutionalized, and its relevant patterns 
are “habitually known, practiced and accepted”67 by the relevant actors, the regime will experience 
certain degree of durability and permanence which extends beyond particular governments. It is 
these patterns which are then categorized as belonging to a democratic, hybrid, authoritarian or 
even totalitarian regime type. Changes in a country’s political regime can lead to transitions both 
towards and away from democracy, as well as transitions towards and away from authoritarianism. 
The state, on the other hand, is typically a more permanent structure than a regime. Fishman cha-
racterizes the state as a structure of “domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus 
and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it”.68 Lastly, the government is 
the least permanent level of political organization. Changes in government are a normal part of 
democratic politics. In new democracies, however, changes in governments serve as a measure 
of the country’s democratic consolidation and the political elites’ commitment to observing de-
mocratic governance and practices.  Commenting on the significance of a country’s second go-
vernmental turnover and the location of the governmental level under the regime level, Samuel 
Huntington notes that it shows “both elites and publics are operating within the democratic sys-
tem; when things go wrong, you change the rulers, not the regime”.69
Having delineated what a political regime is and the difference between it and other levels of po-
litical organization, definitions for both transition and transformation will now be enunciated. In 
their influential work Transitions from Autocracy, O’Donnell and Schmitter developed a conci-
se and parsimonious definition of a transition. They refer to transitions simply as “the interval bet-
ween one political regime and another”.70 While the most common usage of the term has been 
63 Fishman 1990: 432.
64 Cf. Merkel 1999: 73. 
65 Cf. Merkel 1999: 73.
66 Fishman 1990: 428.
67 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 73.
68 Fishman 1990: 428.
69 Huntington 1991: 267. 
70 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 6. 
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in the context of a country transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic regime71, O’Don-
nell and Schmitter recognize that transitions can progress towards or away from democracy and 
democratic gains can either be consolidated or reversed. The term transformation, on the other 
hand, is much broader than the term transition, and is positioned at the system level. It does not 
possess a specific meaning, per se, but is used rather more generically as an umbrella term for all 
possible variations of political transition, at all levels.72 
The final concept to be defined in this section is democratization. Reduced to its most basic com-
ponents, democratization simply refers to the transition from a non-democratic regime to a de-
mocratic regime. In more specific terms laid out by O’Donnell and Schmitter, democratization is 
“the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political ins-
titutions previously governed by other principles […], or expanded to include persons not previ-
ously enjoying such rights and obligations […], or extended to cover issues and institutions not 
previously subject to citizen participation […]”.73 Democratization is usually initiated in non-de-
mocratic regimes by way of a process of liberalization, whereby rights are redefined and exten-
ded.74 It is concluded when democracy has been sufficiently institutionalized and consolidated in 
a particular country. In the following section, an overview of the scholarly debate of democratiza-
tion will be presented, along with a summary of current research. It is from this theoretical deba-
te that the study’s IVs will be drawn from. 
3.2. An Overview of the Scholarly Debate on Democratization
Commenting on the complexity of transition situations, which are fraught with difficulties, dan-
gers and setbacks, Adam Przeworski aptly observes in his 1991 study Democracy and the Mar-
ket the following: 
The strategic problem of transition is to get to democracy without being either killed by 
those who have arms or starved by those who control productive resources. As this very 
formulation suggests, the path to democracy is mined […] In most countries where de-
mocracy has been established, it has turned out to be fragile. And in some countries, tran-
sitions have gotten stuck.75 
This has been most evident in the post-Soviet space, where the breakdown of the Soviet Uni-
on has led to outcomes that have ranged from consolidated democracies, to hybrid regimes and 
(re)consolidated autocracies. Naturally, the question arises as to what can account for the variati-
71 Cf. Merkel 1999: 75.
72 Cf. Ibid. 76. 
73 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 8. 
74 Cf. Ibid. 7. 
75 Przeworski 1991: 37.
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on in outcomes to situations of regime breakdown and political and economic transition. Social 
scientists have been grappling with this question since at least the 19th century. Karl Marx (1818-
1883), inspired by Hegel, is attributed with having developed the first coherent model of political, 
economic and social development and transformation.76 His work was further developed by the 
German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) as well as Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950). The 
term “transformation” was used for the first time by Karl Polyani (1886-1964) in his 1944 work The 
Great Transformation. Polyani saw the failure of the liberal market economy with the onset of 
the Great Depression in 1929 as an engine of transformation which led to the appearance of So-
viet Communism, fascism and the New Deal on the world stage.77
3.2.1. Early Structuralist Approaches: Modernization Theory
One very important attempt to explain why certain countries have developed into democratic po-
litical systems while others failed, was what came to be known as modernization theory. This ap-
proach emerged around the end of the 1950s and remained dominant into the 1970s. One of its 
key theoreticians was the American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset (1922-2006). In nu-
merous studies, Lipset sought to provide evidence for a correlation between a country’s econom-
ic development and other social requisites and its level of democratization. As Lipset simply puts 
it, “concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy”.78 In this sense, modernization theory took on a rather deterministic outlook 
on the development of democracy, where by its attainment was simply the final step in a univer-
sally valid process of modernization. Critiquing these deterministic aspects of modernization the-
ory and its neglect of agency, Adam Przeworski writes that “the method characteristic of this ap-
proach is to associate inductively outcomes, such as democracy or fascism, with initial conditions 
[…]. In this formulation the outcome is uniquely determined by conditions, and history goes on 
without anyone ever doing anything”.79
3.2.2. The Transition School of Democratization: Actor-Centered Approaches
Another critic of modernization theory was the German-American political scientist Dankwart Ru-
stow (1924-1996), considered the father of transitology. His 1970 article ‘Transitions to democra-
cy’ lead to a paradigm shift in how political scientists approached the question of political transi-
tion and democratization, placing a greater emphasis on the role of actors. Rustow attempted to 
create a “genetic theory” of democratization, explaining how democracy comes about and how 
76 Cf. Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener 2015: 12. 
77 Cf. Ibid. 14.
78 Lipset 1959: 75.
79 Przeworski 1991: 96. 
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it thrives. In contrast to several aspects of modernization theory, Rustow assumed that transi-
tion to democracy need not be “a world-wide uniform process, that it always involves the same 
social classes, the types of political issues, or even the same methods of solution”.80 In his model, 
the only precondition, or “background condition”, for democratization to begin to take place was 
what he termed “national unity”. National unity, as Rustow puts it, implies that the “vast majority 
of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political 
community they belong to”.81 Three further phases are presented in Rustow’s model, including an 
entrenched and serious unresolved conflict, an attempt at reaching a compromise through the 
introduction of democratic rules, and lastly, the public and political classes becoming habituated 
with these new rules. 
 Rustow’s actor-centered model would come to serve as the theoretical foundation for 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead’s several volume study enti-
tled Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, which appeared in the late 1980s. Adam Przeworski’s 
1991 work Democracy and the Market would also prove to be very influential in this context. 
These sets of studies would come to dominate the debate on transitions in political science for at 
least a decade, and would contribute to the widespread usage of the term “transition”, as opposed 
to “transformation”.82 They also shifted their focus to the micro level analysis of elite interactions 
with actors from civil society. O’Donnell and Schmitter’s model of transition is more descriptive 
and empirical in nature and focuses on a changing constellation of actors in processes of democ-
ratization. Transition situations, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, hinge upon the opening of 
authoritarian regimes and their fracturing into two separate camps, namely hardliners and soft-lin-
ers. The soft-liners then proceed to form a negotiated pact with parts of the opposition in order to 
eventually carry out democratic reforms.83 Przeworski, on the other hand, injects rational choice 
theory into his analysis of regime openings and democratization. His approach is modeled using 
game theory at each strategic level on the path from liberalization to possible democratization.84
80 Rustow 1970: 345.
81 Ibid. 358.
82 Cf. Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener 2015: 15f. 
83 Cf. Brückner 2015: 93.
84 Cf. Ibid. 94. 
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3.2.3. Beyond the Transition Paradigm: The Grey Area and Authoritarian Diffusion 
and Promotion
In the 2000s, the transition paradigm85 would come under scrutiny and critique as it became in-
creasingly clear that a large number of countries considered “transition countries” were not follow-
ing the transition model outlined above. Describing the political trajectory of many of the countries 
labeled transition countries by transitologists, Thomas Carothers claims that “most of the ‘transi-
tional countries’, however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have 
entered a political gray zone. They have some attributes of democratic political life […], yet they 
suffer from serious democratic deficits”.86 Echoing Carothers’ criticism, Russian political scientist 
Vladimir Gel’man urges researches of democratization to move beyond the overly simplistic un-
derstanding of the transition paradigm and its application to post-Soviet countries and to adopt 
a more realistic research agenda. He notes in his 2002 article ‘Post-Soviet transitions and democ-
ratization: Towards theory-building’ that it is necessary for researchers to “go beyond those ‘tran-
sition’ and ‘consolidation’ studies that resemble the paradigm of a Hollywood film. According to 
that paradigm, ‘good guys’ (this is, democrats) are confronted by ‘bad guys’ (anti-democrats) and 
invariably the film has a happy ending (the victory of the ‘good guys’)”.87
With their 2010 publication Competitive Authoritarianism, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way 
sought to take on such a research agenda. In their approach, Levitsky and Way focus on coun-
tries stuck in the grey zone between authoritarianism and democracy. Instead of viewing them as 
countries which had failed to democratize, they instead treat them as a distinct category, namely 
competitive authoritarian regimes. As Levitsky and Way put it, “rather than ‘partial’, ‘incomplete’, or 
‘unconsolidated democracies, these cases should be conceptualized for what they are: a distinct, 
nondemocratic regime type. Instead of assuming that such regimes are in transition to democ-
racy, it is more useful to ask why some democratized and others did not”.88 Investigating why hy-
brid regimes succeeded or failed in democratizing, Levitsky and Way reintroduce structural factors 
into their analysis. These factors, which serve as the explanatory variables, include ties to the West, 
which they conceptualize as links and leverages89, as well as the strength of the governing-party 
85 In his 2002 article ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Thomas Carothers lays out five underlying assumptions of 
the transition paradigm. These assumptions are as follows: 1. If a country is moving away from authoritarianism, it 
can also be considered to be moving toward democracy; 2. Transition situations unfold in a particular succession of 
stages; 3. Elections are believed to possess a deterministic quality in the process of democratization and the con-
tinued holding of elections will deepen the transition to democracy; 4. The rejection of structural explanations in 
accounting for the onset of the democratization processes; 5. The transitions to democracy taking place within the 
third wave of democratization are happening in functioning and coherently constructing countries (Cf. Carothers 
2002: 6-8). 
86 Ibid. 9. 
87 Gel’man 2002: 100. 
88 Levitsky and Way 2010: 4. 
89 Levitsky and Way describe leverages as  a “government’s vulnerability to external democratizing pressure” (Ibid. 40), 
while linkages are considered the “cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people and information) among 
particular countries and the United States, the EU […] and Western-dominated multilateral institutions” (Ibid. 43). 
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and the organizations of a particular country.90 The authors view linkages with the West as being 
key to understanding which competitive authoritarian regimes were successful in democratizing, 
while geographical proximity to the West is considered the most important source of linkages.91 
However, Levitsky and Way’s approach has received criticism on exactly this point. As Ghia Nodia 
points out, geographical proximity seems an intuitive explanation to successful democratization, 
however “there are glaring exceptions as well. Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Belarus shares borders with 
three NATO and EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), yet is has justly been called ‘Eu-
rope’s last dictatorship’ and a ‘Stalinist Jurassic Park’”.92
In more recent studies on democratization and regime transition, especially in the post-Soviet 
space, some observers have begun focusing on factors which hinder democratization processes 
from taking place and democratic gains from being consolidated. In this analysis, the international 
dimension of authoritarianism and its influence on non-democratic rule has come to play a central 
explanatory role. Referring to the gaps in transition literature, Julia Bader et al. note the following:
What has not yet been the subject of extensive research, however, is the role played by out-
side powers in helping to bring about, or stabilise, non-democratic rule. Some observers, 
though, have begun to associate the finding of stagnant democratisation with the pheno-
menon of newly emerging non-democratic powers within a changing world order, and most 
prominently of China and Russia.93
One body of research which has undertaken this approach has focused on what is termed author-
itarian diffusion.94 In the context of transitions in the post-Soviet space, diffusion was initially em-
ployed to explain democratic transition in the region. One such study was conducted by Valerie 
Bunce and Sharon Wolchik.95 The authors sought to link two waves of mass mobilizations in CEE 
to diffusion dynamics.96 The first of these two popular mobilizations occurred between 1987 and 
1990, which precipitated the collapse of the communist bloc, and again between 1996 and 2005, 
during the wave of colored revolutions in CEE. Researchers of authoritarian diffusion, on the other 
hand, are more interested in explaining the staying power of non-democratic regimes and what 
some perceive as a reverse wave of democratization.97 
90 Cf. Ibid. 5. 
91 Cf. Ibid. 44. 
92 Nodia 2014: 144. 
93 Bader et al. 2010: 84.
94 Some examples include: Gel’man and Lankina 2008; Ambrosio 2010; Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Bader 2014.
95 See: Bunce and Wolchik 2010.
96 Bunce and Wolchik describe diffusion as always involving “a conscious decision by local actors, sometimes in colla-
boration with international allies, to copy innovations introduce by actors in other contexts – a decision that flows 
from their values and interests that takes into account expanded opportunities, incentives, and capacity for chan-
ge” (Ibid. 34). 
97 Cf. Erdmann et al. 2013: 4. 
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 A further approach which falls into this category is the body of research which has been 
conducted on autocracy promotion.98 Much like authoritarian diffusion was based on the diffu-
sion of democratic practices, autocracy promotion has its theoretical origins in the scholarly lit-
erature on Western democracy promotion. Whereas there is a relatively comprehensive body of 
studies on external actors and democratization, and increasingly pertaining to hybrid regimes, 
Nicole Jackson notes that “there is little, if any, that explicitly theorizes or explains the process of 
‘autocratization’ […] In particular, there is little written that explores the role of external factors 
and whether and how they influence regimes to maintain status quo, or ‘upgrade’ or strengthen 
authoritarian elements in their political systems”.99 Compared to authoritarian diffusion, autocra-
cy promotion is based on the premise that the external influence exerted on foreign countries is 
a conscious decision on the part of the authoritarian country doing the influencing. This is due in 
part to the desire of an authoritarian regime to not only strengthen its own internal position, but 
to also shore up its position in its own neighborhood, in order to be able to maximize its own in-
fluence, all the while attempting to minimize the influence of external powers, such as the USA or 
the EU.100 A more in depth analysis of the theoretical foundation of autocracy promotion will be 
presented below in section 3.3.  
3.2.4. Rentier Theory Approach
In addition to the theoretical approaches to democratization and transition presented above, a 
brief overview of one final theory will be presented, namely the rentier state theory approach. The 
rentier state theory has its origins in the literature on political economy and democratization. Bro-
ken down to their most simple constitute parts, political economic approaches are primarily con-
cerned with investigating the interaction between economics and politics. The rentier state the-
ory itself was originally developed by Hossein Mahdavy in the context of pre-revolutionary Iran, 
however in subsequent studies, this approach has also been applied to countries in the post-So-
viet space to investigate the effects of rentierism on democratization and governance.101 A rent is 
considered “the difference between the value of production at world prices and the total costs of 
production”102, while a rentier state is one in which the economy is dominated by such rents. The 
sources of the rents can range from the sale of natural point resources such as natural gas or oil, 
to the transit of such resources through pipelines or subsidies from foreign governments or for-
eign grants.103 Rentierism has a negative effect on country’s democratic performance, in so far as 
98 Examples of such studies include: Tolstrup 2009; Bader et al. 2010; Jackson 2010; Burnell 2010; Vanderhill 2013. 
99 Jackson 2010: 103. 
100 Cf. Tolstrup 2009: 925.
101 See: Grzymala-Busse 2008; Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov 2009, 2011; Meissner 2010a; Götz 2011; Balmaceda 2013; 
Shaw 2013. 
102 The World Bank (2015): ‘Oil rents (as % of GDP)’ < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS> (Acces-
sed 20.04.2015).
103 Cf. Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov 2009: 11. 
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the income and distribution of the rents reduce a government’s need to tax its citizens and ad-
dress their needs, while the windfall profits can also be used to shore up the position of govern-
ing elites in terms of both military and security spending, as well as the construction of patron-
age networks. As a result of this, “state institutions are weakened and the rents are not utilized to 
guarantee long-term, sustainable socioeconomic development”.104 A more in depth presentation 
of the rentier state theory will be presented below in section 3.3.
3.3. The Theoretical Basis of the IVs
Drawing from the relevant scholarly debate on democratization outlined above, this study’s two 
IVs will be drawn from the rentier state approach as well as the literature focusing on the recent 
debate surrounding the promotion of autocracy by external actors. The rentier state theory has 
been applied primarily to post-Soviet countries rich in natural resources, such as Azerbaijan, Russia 
and Kazakhstan. However, post-Soviet countries poor in their own natural resources, such as Belar-
us and Ukraine, but which benefit from the rents associated with the transport of point resources 
from Russia westwards, have recently also been studied in this context, but primarily in regards 
to energy dependency.105 This study wants to therefore look at the effects of rents on democrat-
ic performance post-Soviet states which are both poor and rich in energy resources. With regards 
to the second IV, this study would like to contribute the growing body of literature on external ac-
tors and autocracy promotion in the post-Soviet space. 
3.3.1. The Theoretical Basis of IV 1: The Amount of Energy Rents
The theoretical underpinning of IV 1 is the rentier state theory. With his 1970 article ‘The pattern 
and problems with economic development in rentier states’, the economist Hossein Mahdavy was 
the first to postulate the theory of a rentier state. In the 1950s and 1960s, it had been assumed that 
natural resource wealth could allow a developing country to catch up with the developed coun-
tries.106 However, this approach was eventually refuted due to contradictory empirical evidence. 
In his article, Mahdavy described a rentier state as one which regularly receives substantial exter-
nal rents, with rents being sums of money paid to certain individuals, companies or governments 
by foreign individuals, companies or governments.107 Regarding the disproportional relationship 
between investments and gains in energy-rich rentier states, Mahdavy writes that “the input re-
quirements of the oil industry from the local economies […] is so insignificant, that for all practical 
purposes one can consider the oil revenues almost as a free gift of nature or as a grant from for-
104 Meissner 2010a: 10. 
105 See: Balmaceda 2011, 2013. 
106 This theory was referred to as the ‘staple theory of economic growth’ (Cf. Meissner 2010a: 9; Rosser 2006: 7).   
107 Cf. Mahdavy 1970: 428. 
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eign sources”.108 Hazem Beblawi further expanded upon Mahdavy’s definition of rentier state, add-
ing further defining characteristics and differentiating between a rentier state and a rentier econ-
omy.109 Those receiving the external rents are generally considered an autonomous social group, 
which is characterized by a so-called “rentier mentality”.110 
The rentier state theory is generally subordinated to the literature on the “resource curse”.111 Con-
trary to early studies mentioned above, since the late 1980s, a consensus has been established 
that the abundance of particular natural resources can be harmful to a country’s development. 
This consensus, according to Andrew Rosser, contends that this abundance “increases the likeli-
hood that countries will experience negative economic, political and social outcomes including 
poor economic performance, low levels of democracy, and civil war”.112 Furthermore, this consen-
sus has become so influential, that “the idea that natural resources are bad for development is now 
widely accepted by researchers and officials at the major international financial institutions, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund”.113
Economic explanations for the negative impact of natural resource wealth on a country’s develop-
ment have focused on the so-called “Dutch Disease” as well as poor economic linkages between 
economic sectors engaged in natural resource extraction and non-energy based sectors, such as 
agriculture or manufacturing. The former describes a causal mechanism, whereby the extraction 
and export of natural resources causes a country’s real exchange rate and currency to appreci-
ate. This in turn reduces the competitiveness of non-energy related sections of the economy. The 
booming energy sector further attracts labor and capital, thus increasing the production costs of 
other economic sectors. In this context, “the export of agricultural and manufactured goods de-
clines and the costs of the goods and services that cannot be imported inflate. The vicious cycle 
culminates in an overall macroeconomic crisis”.114 The latter outlines a further economic scenario, 
whereby a boom in commodities exports has little effect on non-export sectors. In the end, cer-
tain sectors of the economy continue to boom, while unaffiliated sectors remain backwards and 
underdeveloped.115 
Other research has attempted to explain the underlying political causal mechanisms responsible 
108 Ibid. 429. 
109 Beblawi developed four specific characteristics of a rentier state, namely: 1. Rent situations dominate the country’s 
economy; 2. The country’s economy relies on a substantial external rent; 3. Few are engaged in the generation of 
the rent wealth, while a majority take part in its distribution; 4. In a rentier state, the government is the primary re-
cipient of the external rents (Cf. Beblawi 1990: 51f ). 
110 On the differences between the common economic mentality and the rentier mentality, Beblawi writes that the 
latter “embodies a break in the work-reward causation. Reward – income or wealth – is not related to work and risk 
bearing, rather to chance or situation. For a rentier, reward becomes a windfall gain […] against the conventional 
outlook where reward is integrated in a process as the end result of a long, systematic and organized production 
circuit” (Ibid. 52). 
111 Cf. Meissner 2010a: 9. 
112 Rosser 2006: 7. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Meissner 2010a: 10. 
115 Cf. Ibid. 9. 
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for the negative effects of rentierism on democratic performance. In his influential article “Does 
oil hinder democracy?’ from 2001, Michael Ross approaches rentierism from a primarily political/
state-centered perspective. He develops three distinct causal mechanisms responsible for the det-
rimental effects of energy rents on democracy, which he refers to as a “rentier effect”, a “suppres-
sion effect” and a “modernization effect”. The “rentier effect” affects how a country carries out its 
taxation policy. Windfall profits due to rents from the energy sector decrease a government’s need 
to tax its population and this in turn leads to gaps in accountability between those who govern 
and those who are governed. Regarding the historical and political rational behind the “rentier ef-
fect”, Ross observes that “historians and political scientists have argued that the demand for rep-
resentation in government arose in response to the sovereign’s attempt to raise taxes”.116 In such 
a situation, a government obtains the support of its population not by taxation and representa-
tion, but rather through the distribution of allocation of rents.117 In this way, energy rents enable 
governments to “buy support” through patronage networks and clientelist relationships, which 
serves to increase society’s dependence on the government and its financial allocations and dis-
tort class structures.118
A further causal mechanism conceptualized by Ross is the “suppression effect”. The “suppression ef-
fect” refers to a process whereby government elites are able to use energy rents in a discretionary 
manner to bolster the government’s security forces and apparatus. This in turn increases its abili-
ty to effectively clamp down on any dissent that may occur, further cementing the government’s 
hold on power and access to energy rents. Regarding the political desires of citizens in a rentier 
state, Michael Ross observes that “citizens in resource-rich states may want democracy as citizens 
elsewhere, but resource wealth may allow their governments to spend more on internal security 
and so block the population’s democratic aspirations”.119 
The final causal mechanism developed by Ross is the “modernization effect”, which is a social mech-
anism based on modernization theory. It claims that the two most important social developments 
for facilitating democracy are rising education levels amongst the citizenry as well as increasing 
work specialization, which allows for more independent thought and action as well as a stronger 
bargaining power with elites, due to their specialized skills.120 If rent wealth does not lead to in-
creases in education levels and occupational specialization, it is assumed that it also will not lead 
to democratization.
One final approach to the effects of rentierism on democratic performance are those put forth in 
the state-centered political economy literature on the topic. The political economy approach in-
cludes institutions in its analysis of the effects of resource rents on the democratic performance 
116 Ross 2001: 332f. 
117 See: Luciani 1990b. 
118 Cf. Herb 2005: 298. 
119 Ross 2001: 335. 
120 Cf. Ibid. 336. 
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of a country. Regarding the role of institutions in political economy analyses, Alberto Alesina and 
Roberto Perotti write that “political-economy models begin with the assertion that economic pol-
icy choices are not made by social planners, who live only in academic papers. Rather, economic 
policy is the result of political struggle within an institutional structure”.121 Therefore for political 
economy models, rent-seeking behavior and the misuse of energy rents for maintaining patron-
age networks happens in the context of weak institutions.122 If a country has strong institutions, 
energy rents will not have nearly as detrimental effect on the political system or economy as in a 
country with weak and underdeveloped institutions. As an example, the effects of natural resource 
wealth and energy rents on Norway’s political and economic system were much different than in 
countries with weaker institutions, such as Algeria or Angola.123
3.3.2. The Theoretical Basis of IV 2: The Degree of Russian External Leverage 
The theoretical underpinning of IV 2 is the literature on autocracy promotion and the effects of 
external influences on regime changes. One of the factors initiating scholarly interest in the phe-
nomenon of authoritarian regimes attempting to promote autocracy was the perceived decline 
in democracy worldwide in the late 2000’s. Regarding Freedom House’s 2009 assessment of the 
so-called “freedom recession”, Peter Burnell writes that “there is currently speculation about how 
far this trend can be attributed to the possibility that leading autocratic regimes are now on the 
march not just at home, but also in terms of their external relations, influencing other countries 
around the world. An important question is whether the so-called democratic rollback is benefit-
ting from the help of foreign friends of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule?”124 
The role of external factors in shaping regime change or outcomes in developing countries and 
those undergoing transformation was previously under researched in political science. Whereas 
the discipline of comparative politics focuses primarily on the internal factors which influence re-
gime change, various branches of international relations theory tend to ignore the effects of inter-
state interaction on domestic politics.125 After the end of the Cold War, however, the United States 
began to invest heavily in democracy promotion in various parts of the world, while the expansion 
of the EU and the conditionality imposed on prospective member states exerted noticeably posi-
tive effects on the political development of many post-communist countries in CEE. These devel-
opments led to increased interest in the influence of external factors on regime change, however 
this interest was primarily limited to the external promotion of democracy.
Along with the perceived “freedom recession”, events in the post-Soviet space following the Col-
121 Alesina and Perotti 1994: 351. 
122 Cf. Kolstad and Wiig 2009: 5318. 
123 Cf. Ibid. 
124 Burnell 2010: 1. 
125 Cf. Ibid. 494. 
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ored Revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in which authoritarian states in the 
region sought to contain the contagion of electoral revolutions, also brought the phenomenon 
of autocracy promotion to the attention of scholars. In the aftermath of the Colored Revolutions, 
the Belarussian political scientist Vitali Silitski observed two processes taking place in the post-So-
viet region, namely the “reassertion of Russia’s (authoritarian) regional hegemony” as well as the es-
tablishing of a so-called authoritarian international, which he referred to as “authoritarian conver-
gence”.126 Describing these processes, Silitski writes: 
While some parts of the chain of revolutionary dominoes fell against the will of the regional 
hegemon, the Kremlin turned the more recent revolutionary states into battlegrounds whe-
re forces of change had to face uphill battles against forces or regression even as revolutions 
succeeded. These battleground conditions not only impeded democratic consolidation […] 
but also made them even less suitable to be nurseries of new revolutions.127
Autocracy promotion is, however, not a new phenomenon. During the Interwar Period (1919-1939), 
the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini’s fascist Italy as well as National Socialist Ger-
many played a considerable role in the collapse of democratic governance on the European con-
tinent.128 During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union supported non-de-
mocratic regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In Latin America, for example, the United States 
worked to undermine socialist governments and prevent potential Soviet allies from emerging. 
Furthermore, Washington was willing to give material and political support to anti-communist dic-
tatorships to achieve this end. In CEE, the Soviet Union intervened militarily to suppress liberal re-
form movements in the countries of the Warsaw Pact from gaining ground.129 In this sense, both 
democratic as well as authoritarian regimes can act as promoters of autocracy. 
There are several prevalent explanations for why democracies would choose to promote democracy 
internationally. These range from idealistic arguments, whereby countries feel a sense of respon-
sibility to further a system of governance deemed beneficial to mankind, to the “democratic pea-
ce” theory, which claims that democracies do not wage war against one another.130 Other approa-
ches view democracy promotion through a national security-oriented lens, whereby democratic 
governance removes the wellsprings of terrorism, such as political oppression, while others stress 
the economic benefits of democratic governance.131 
With regard to autocracy promotion, there are three general strands of literature dealing with this 
topic and the question as to why autocracies would be interested in promoting their particular form 
126 Silitski 2010: 341.
127 Ibid.
128 Cf. Kästner 2015: 493.
129 Cf. Ibid. 
130 Cf. Burnell 2010: 10.
131 Cf. Ibid. 
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of governance. One such approach is presented by Thomas Ambrosio in his 2010 article ‘Construc-
ting a framework of authoritarian diffusion’. Ambrosio’s concept of autocratic diffusion is based on 
two causal mechanisms developed by Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, namely appropriateness 
and effectiveness.132 Appropriateness stipulates that policy decisions made by one government 
change the environment and the cost-benefit analysis of other governments making subsequent 
decisions. In such a scenario, certain practices become either more or less likely.133 Relating this 
mechanism to autocratic diffusion, Ambrosio writes that “the rise of authoritarian powers and the 
relative decline of their democratic counterparts to set global standards could create conditions 
in which the relative appropriateness of democracy and autocracy would shift more toward the 
latter”.134 Effectiveness refers simply to the weighing of the pros and cons of adopting certain be-
haviors or policies by observing their success and failure in other countries. Examples of this me-
chanism include the effectiveness of China’s authoritarian state-capitalist economic model as well 
as Russia’s attempts to insulate itself from outside political pressure.135 The more effective these 
policies prove to be, the more likely they will be adopted by other actors. While diffusion tends to 
describe a process whereby the transfer of ideas, practices or structures occurs without intention, 
Ambrosio does provide space for such intentions in his model, focusing on actors disseminating 
practices, but stopping short of forcing others to accept them. According to Ambrosio, “current au-
tocrats wish to create conditions which delegitimize regime change and protect state (that is, regi-
me) sovereignty. Rather than impose their form of government on others, they are primarily con-
cerned with ensuring that the democratic West cannot impose its form of government on them”.136
Julia Bader, Jörn Grävingholt and Antje Kästner approach autocracy promotion through a theoreti-
cal framework which combines a micro-level rational choice foundation with liberal foreign policy 
analysis. The authors start with the assumption that the preference for domestic political survival 
also influences a political actor’s foreign policy choices. In order to retain power, an actor has to 
allocate goods to key social groups or coalitions, however the coalitions differ in democratic and 
authoritarian societies. While democratic coalitions tend to be broad and demand large amounts 
of public goods, autocratic coalitions tend to be smaller and leaders require private goods to buy 
loyalty. In essence, democratic societies are more geared towards forming encompassing coali-
tions while autocratic states tend more towards distributional coalitions.137 These domestic fac-
tors thus drive demand for system convergence in a given region, due to similar incentive struc-
tures. As Bader et al. write, “for an autocratic regional power, the existence of smaller autocracies 
with additional allocation leeway, such as natural resources or certain geo-strategic assets, would 
132 See: Elkins and Simmons 2005. 
133 Cf. Ambrosio 2010: 379f. 
134 Ibid. 380.
135  f. Ibid. 382.
136 Ambrosio 2010: 378.
137 Cf. Bader et al. 2010: 86. 
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contribute to the government’s commitment to pay off its coalition”.138
In two more recent studies, Rachel Vanderhill and Jakob Tolstrup have contributed further to the 
scholarly debate of autocracy promotion. In her 2013 book Promoting Authoritarianism Abro-
ad, Vanderhill considers how states promote authoritarianism and how it interacts with democracy 
promotion as well as local conditions in order to produce regime change. She focuses on how ex-
ternal actors, using positive and negative incentives, can alter the strategies and capabilities of 
elites in the receiving state, thus moving the existing regime in either a more democratic or au-
thoritarian direction. For Vanderhill, the term autocracy promotion refers to a situation where an 
external actor “is actively supporting illiberal elites, groups, or regimes through direct assistan-
ce”.139 She views autocracy promotion by an autocratic power in its region as a strategy to increa-
se its national security as well as the likelihood of regime survival.140 In his 2013 publication Rus-
sia vs� The EU, Tolstrup employs a positivist research agenda to study the influence of external 
actors (The EU and Russia) on the democratization in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Tolstrup then 
discerns between positive external actors which strengthen another country’s democratic perfor-
mance, and negative external actors which weaken a country’s democratic performance. Accor-
ding to Tolstrup, “it is possible for an external actor to act as both (regardless of its intentions), de-
pending on the time and place, thus leaving it to the empirical analysis to settle the question”.141 
Tolstrup’s model of how external actors affect the democratization of a country focuses on geogra-
phical, historical and cultural factors, as well as linkages to external actors and the external actors’ 
leverage. Similar to Vanderhill, Tolstrup also focuses on the role elites play in the process, which 
he terms “Gatekeeper Elites”, and how they can facilitate or hinder linkages to an external actor.142
138 Ibid. 88.
139 Vanderhill 2013: 9.
140 Cf. Ibid. 
141 Tolstrup 2013: 27. 
142 Cf. Ibid. 39. 
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4. Research Design 
In this section, the study’s research design will be presented. Based on the work’s theoretical un-
derpinning which was outlined in section 3, the conceptualization as well as the operationaliza-
tion of the study’s two IVs will be carried out. In addition, the hypotheses to be tested empirically 
in section 5 of this work will be listed, and the case selection as well as the empirical study’s time 
frame will also be clarified. 
4.1. IV 1: The Amount of Energy Rents
4.1.1. The Conceptualization of IV 1
IV 1’s concept is based on the theoretical underpinning of the rentier state theory which was out-
lined in section three of this paper. Specifically, the IVs conceptualization will follow the state-cen-
tered, political approach presented above. This approach assumes that natural resource wealth 
and high levels of energy rents will have a negative effect on a country’s democratic performance 
through the workings of several causal mechanisms associated with rentierism. In this context, 
high levels of energy rents allow for country’s ruling elites to utilize their country’s energy wealth 
to buy influence and acquiescence through patronage networks, while the need to tax the citizen-
ry is thus reduced, along with the necessity of political representation. High levels of energy rents 
also enable governments to fortify their position by investing resource wealth into the strength-
ening of the regime’s security apparatus, which can be used to suppress dissent or democratic 
movements. These resources can also be utilized to further secure access to revenue streams em-
anating from the energy sector. In society, development based on resource wealth does not lead 
to conditions conducive for the facilitation of higher education rates or the emergence of occu-
pational specialization, which are seen as important factors for the creation of an independent 
middle class. This theoretical underpinning, in turn, leads to this study’s hypothesis for IV 1, which 
is presented below. 
Hypothesis for IV 1 – The Amount of Energy Rents: 
The higher the amount of energy rents, the lower the democratic performance� 
4.1.2. The Operationalization of IV 1
In order to apply the rentier state theory and test the study’s hypothesis for IV 1, an adequate mea-
sure for a country’s respective income by way of natural resource rents will have to be found. In 
this context, the operationalization of IV 1 will be roughly based upon approaches developed by 
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both Roland Götz and Michael Herb.143 As Roland Götz points out, resource rents are often mea-
sured using the following indicators: 
1. Resource endowment per inhabitant; 
2. Resource rents as a percentage of GDP, a percentage of a country’s national budget or 
per inhabitant; 
3. Natural resource exports as a percentage of a country’s entire exports or as a percenta-
ge of GDP.144 
The first approach is promising, however not suitable for this study because the resource endow-
ment simply measures how much of a particular natural resource is present in a country, but it 
does not provide values for the amount of monetary revenue a government may generate through 
its extraction and sale. As Götz points out, the third approach, using natural point resources as a 
percentage of a country’s entire exports or GDP, is the most common approach to measuring and 
studying the effects of energy rents on a country’s political system. However, due to the limited 
scope of this study and the difficulty obtaining reliable and comprehensive statistics regarding 
post-Soviet countries’ exports of natural resources, this study is going to adopt the second appro-
ach mentioned above as a methodological base for the operationalization of IV 1.  More precisely, 
this study will use the following indicators to measure the amount of energy rents: 
• Oil rents (as a percentage of GDP)
• Gas rents (as a percentage of GDP)
This approach is also in line with Michael Herb’s definition of rentierism, which he claims can be measu-
red by “rent revenue as a percentage of total government revenues”.145 Götz includes oil and gas transit 
rents for his case studies, however due to the difficulty obtaining reliable figures for oil and gas transit 
rents for the transit countries included in this study (primarily Belarus, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, 
Moldova and Georgia), the oil and natural gas rents as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank’s Wor-
ld Development Indicators will serve as proxies for the energy rents generated from point resources.146 
As mentioned above, the World Bank’s definition of a rent will utilized for this variable, namely the dif-
ference between the value of production at world prices and the total costs of production. 
In order to measure the amount of energy rents, the natural gas rents as a percentage of GDP will be 
added to the oil rents as a percentage of GDP in order to come up with a figure for the total percenta-
ge of GDP derived from energy rents. 
143 Cf. Götz 2011: 9f; Cf. Herb 2005: 300-3.  
144 Cf. Ibid. 9. 
145 Herb 2005: 303. 
146 In this context, Götz criticizes the World Bank’s measurement of oil and gas rents as being too imprecise. He cont-
ends that that figures used for oil and gas rents can be interpreted as representing an upper limit for the rents, but 
not the actual amounts themselves (Cf. Götz 2011: 10). However, as proxies for oil and gas rents, they 
provide an approximate picture of the percentage of GDP generated through rents and can 
therefore be seen as appropriate for this study.
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4.2. IV 2: The Degree of Russian External Leverage 
4.2.1. The Conceptualization of IV 2
The conceptualization of IV 2 will be based on the theoretical approaches to autocracy promo-
tion presented above in section 3.3.2. This theoretical approach assumes that regional autocrat-
ic powers will strive for system convergence in their neighborhoods in order to increase the like-
lihood of regime survival. External actors can either be categorized as negative or positive actors, 
depending on how they influence regime change in other countries. If an external actor improves 
another country’s democratic performance, it is considered a positive actor, whereas if an external 
diminishes another country’s democratic, it is considered a negative actor. The ties between the 
external actor and the receiving country play a key role in the ability of the external actor to in-
fluence the political regime of the receiving country. In the post-Soviet space, as Vitali Silitski and 
others have pointed out147, Russia has played the role of a “black knight par excellence”148, or a neg-
ative external actor, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in particular following the Col-
ored Revolutions which swept through Eurasia at the beginning of the 2000’s. In the aftermath of 
these events, Russia undertook a “counterrevolutionary offensive in the near abroad”149 in order 
to prevent countries in the region from democratizing and moving closer to the west. Describing 
Russia’s approach dealing with the contagion of electoral revolutions in its neighborhood, Silits-
ki, like Tolstrup, underscores the importance of Russian leverage over countries in the post-Sovi-
et space in its attempt to influence their political trajectories.150 This theoretical underpinning, in 
turn, leads to this study’s hypothesis for IV 2, which is presented below.
Hypothesis for IV 2 – The Degree of Russian External Leverage:
The higher the degree of Russian external leverage, the lower the democratic performance�
4.2.2. The Operationalization of IV 2
In order to apply the theory of autocracy promotion to the post-Soviet states considered in this 
study, an adequate measure for the degree of external Russian leverage is needed. One such ap-
proach has been developed and presented by Jakob Tolstrup in his 2009 article ‘Studying a nega-
tive external actor: Russia’s management of stability and instability in the “Near Abroad”’. Operation-
147 See: Ambrosio 2009; Silitski 2010; Tolstrup 2009 and 2014a and Vanderhill 2013. 
148 Tolstrup 2014b: 8. 
149 Silitski 2010: 345. 
150 In this context, Silitski writes that “Russia’s monopoly position as a supplier of vital natural resources for the majo-
rity of the battleground states gives the Kremlin a permanent powerful resource of influence, coercion, and cont-
rol. The hard power instruments were further enhanced by Russia’s military presence in the conflict zones of some 
battleground states and its de facto protectorate over breakaway regions” (Ibid.). 
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alizing Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space, Tolstrup constructs a framework encompassing 
three distinct categories of Russian foreign policy levers, namely military levers, political levers and 
economic levers. The specific levers from each category that will be investigated in this study are 
presented below in Table 4. 
Table 4: Russian Foreign Policy Levers in the Post-Soviet Space
In order to assess Russia’s external leverage on the six countries included in this study, each of the eight 
separate levers listed above in Table 4 will be evaluated and assigned a rating of “high”, “medium”, or 
“low” for each particular country. A rating of “high” will be assigned a score of 3, a rating of “medium” a 
score of 2, while a “low” rating will be given a score of 1. The scores of all eight levers will be totaled to 
create an aggregate score which will represent the level of external Russian leverage on the respecti-
ve country. A breakdown of the criteria for the “high”, “medium” and “low” rating for each lever will be 
offered below in Table 5. 
These levers capture a broad spectrum of the foreign policy tools Russia has at its disposal in order to 
exert pressure on neighboring states in the so-called Near Abroad. This list of leverages is, however, not 
exhaustive, but it should offer significant insight into Russia’s ability to attempt to influence the politi-
cal trajectories of former Soviet states. According to Tolstrup, Russia tries to exert influence on states in 
the near abroad and influence their development through two approaches, namely managed stabili-
ty and managed instability. The former is “most likely to be conducted in republics that are not striving 
toward Western integration and democratic reforms”, whereas the latter “is most likely to be found in 
countries that seem more or less committed to democratic principles and Western integration”.151 The 
states in the post-Soviet space which belong to the former group include Azerbaijan, Armenia and Bel-
arus, while those that are associated with the latter group are Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.152 Mana-
ged stability refers to Russia’s attempts to stabilize incumbents in country’s which are deemed not to 
threaten Russia’s interests. Managed instability refers to Russia’s strategy of trying to destabilize gover-
nments it sees as unfriendly or with too close ties to the West. In the latter case, “instability is only ac-
151 Tolstrup 2009: 931. 
152 Cf. Ibid. 
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cepted in the short run in the hope that it will lead to regime change and increase Russian influence 
in the longer run”.153
Table 5: Operationalization of IV 2: Degree of Russian External Leverage
153 Tolstrup 2009: 932. 
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4.3. Case Selection and Time Frame
As outlined in the methodology section above, and in line with the positivist approach employed 
in this study, in order test the study’s two IVs, the case selection from the countries Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will take place on the side of the IV using John Stu-
art Mill’s method of difference.154 The cases that will be chosen for the empirical test of the study’s 
hypotheses will be those with the highest degree of variation on the side of the IVs. This means 
that the cases with the highest and lowest values will be selected. Given the similar social, eco-
nomic and political starting points and legacies of former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe and 
the Southern Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many contextual differences be-
tween the countries could be controlled for. The study’s time frame will encompass the years 1993 
to 2014. This period captures the development of post-Soviet countries since having gained inde-
pendence in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. 
With regards to IV 1, the cases to be chosen to test the variable’s hypothesis will be those with both 
the highest and the lowest values for IV 1. Specifically, this means that the cases with the highest 
and lowest mean percentage of GDP derived from oil and natural gas rents over the entire period 
of the study’s time frame (1993-2014) will be selected. In Table 6 below, the mean percentage of 
GDP derived from oil and natural gas rents are presented. 
Table 6: Case Selection for IV 1
Based on the mean percentage of GDP derived from oil and natural gas resources between 1996 
and 2013 presented above, Azerbaijan will be chosen as the case with the highest amount of en-
ergy rents, while Moldova will be selected as the country with the lowest amount of energy rents. 
Although Armenia has the lowest amount of energy rents, with 0.0% of its GDP having been de-
154 See Van Era 1997. 
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rived from oil or gas rents, this case was not chosen due to the fact that throughout the entire time 
period, no measurable oil and natural gas rents were present in its data. Since this was the case, 
the case with the next lowest measureable amount of energy rents was chosen, namely Moldova. 
In regards to IV 2, those cases will be chosen which show the highest and the lowest aggregate val-
ues for the “Degree of Russian External Influence” throughout the study’s time frame (1993-2014). 
Below in Table 7, each country’s values for Russia’s external military, political and economic lever-
ages are presented, along with an aggregate total of those values. The sources and literature used 
to determine the ratings of each leverage for the study’s six countries can be found in the appen-
dix attached at the end of this study.
Table 7: Case Selection for IV 2
Based on the total scores for Russia’s military, political and economic leverages in the post-Soviet 
states investigated in this study, Georgia, has an aggregate score of 21, will be chosen as the case 
with the highest degree of Russian external influence, while Azerbaijan, with an total score of 11, 
will be selected as the case with the lowest degree.  
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5. Empirical Test
In this section, the study’s two hypotheses presented above will be tested on the cases selected 
in section 4. First, the empirical results of the DV “Democratic Performance” for the four selected 
cases will be presented, along with an overview of the political developments in those countries 
since having gained independence in the early 1990s. Second, the empirical results of the study’s 
two IVs, “The Amount of Energy Rents” and “The Degree of External Russian Leverage”, will be laid 
out and accompanied by, in the case of IV 1, an overview of the respective country’s energy sec-
tor, and in the case of IV 2, a summary of Russian influence on the particular country’s political, 
economic and social systems since 1993. A discussion of the results of the empirical test will be 
carried out below in section 6. 
5.1. DV: Degree of Democratic Performance
5.1.1. Azerbaijan 
Table 8: Azerbaijan: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings
Azerbaijan is located in the Southern Caucasus region of Eurasia on the western shore of the Cas-
pian Sea. The oil-rich nation has a population of roughly 9.3 million inhabitants. In terms of polit-
ical leadership, Azerbaijan represents one of the only dynastic regimes in the post-Soviet space, 
following the presidential succession from Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) to his son Ilham Aliyev (2003 
to present) in 2003. The Aliyev regime has been considered a hegemonic authoritarian regime, 
characterized by an acute lack of political competition.155
Not unlike other states in the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan experienced an extremely difficult 
transition from being a member state of the Soviet Union to being an independent country. The 
early 1990s were marred by ethnic violence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis which culmina-
ted in open warfare between Azerbaijan and Armenians in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Kara-
155 Cf. LePorte 2015: 341. 
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bakh in 1992. A ceasefire was eventually signed in May 1994 between the belligerent parties, after 
significant territorial gains had been made by Armenians and the Azerbaijani military forces had 
suffered a succession of crushing defeats.156 It was in this chaotic political environment that Hey-
dar Alieyev captured the office of the presidency after having carried out a military coup in March 
1993. During the Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, Aliyev had been one of Azerbaijan’s most 
important powerbrokers, having served as the head of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., the head of Azerbai-
jan’s K.G.B. as well as a member of the republic’s Politburo.157 
After taking power in a country in political, economic and social chaos after a brief political opening 
at the end of the Soviet period and the beginning of independence, Aliyev “promoted stability 
over national assertion, and made state-building and regime consolidation the overriding objec-
tives of his remaining years in power”.158 After surviving several assassination and coup attempts, 
Heydar Aliyev was able to consolidate his political regime by the end of the 1990s. This was also 
due in part to the privatization of the country’s oil and gas fields to foreign investors, as opposed 
to domestic actors. This ensured that the Azerbaijan would “benefit from foreign technical exper-
tise without losing control of how the resulting revenues would be used, unlike in Russia, which 
privatized to domestic actors”.159 By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, oil re-
venues would account for circa 40% of the country’s overall revenues. 
As Azerbaijan’s political rights and civil liberties ratings, presented above in Table 8, show, the 
Caucasian republic had been considered an “unfree”, authoritarian regime since Heydar Alieyev 
came to power in a coup in 1993. However, during the years 1997 to 2002, his regime was able to 
make slight improvements in the area of civil liberties, which helped Azerbaijan obtain a “partly 
free” rating from Freedom House. This was due to the fact that in 1995 and 2000, Azerbaijan held 
parliamentary elections with opposition parties and, as Scott Radnitz points out, “a moderately 
independent media developed in the mid-1990s and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
supported by the West opened in the country”.160 However, at the beginning of the 2000s, inco-
me from oil sales allowed the regime to strengthen its position and prevent serious challenges 
from the opposition from endangering its rule. After falling ill with cancer, Heydar Aliyev died in 
November 2003. However, before his death, Heydar installed his son, Ilham Aliyev, as prime mi-
nister and campaigned for him to become the country’s next president. Ilham was subsequently 
elected president in November 2003 in elections marred by fraud, causing widespread unrest in 
the capital city Baku.
156 Cf. Ibid. 344. 
157 Cf. Radnitz 2012: 62. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 64. 
160 Radnitz 2012: 63. 
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Figure 2: Azerbaijan: Democratic Performance (1993-2014)
Since coming to power, Ilham has managed to prevent the contagion of political unrest from 
both the Colored Revolutions as well as the Arab Spring from penetrating Azerbaijan. Fraudulent 
elections in both 2003 and 2005 drew protestors into the streets and elicited a violent crackdown 
from the government. Elections held in both 2008 and 2013, however, have become decreasingly 
competitive, have generated less and less interest from society161 and have taken place without 
international observers.162 2014 saw an unprecedented crack on civil society in Azerbaijan in light 
of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the ouster of Victor Yanukovych. U.S.-based NGOs, for 
example, were forced to close, while prominent human rights defenders, lawyers and opposition 
journalists were arrested on politically motivated charges.163 Independent media experienced a 
similar crackdown in 2014. 
This deterioration in political and civil liberties is evident in Figure 2 above, which displays Azer-
baijan’s values for the DV “Democratic Performance” between 1993 and 2014, along with a trend 
line.  With the exception of the period from 1997 to 2000 where Azerbaijan was considered “part-
ly free” due to modest liberalization mentioned above, the country has consistently remained an 
“unfree” authoritarian regime. This continuing authoritarian trend has only deepened in recent ye-
ars. Regarding the regimes longevity, trajectory and declining democratic performance, Scott Rad-
nitz writes that “the foremost medium-term factor ensuring its security was the consolidation of 
the ruling elite, which shared common methods of governing and benefitted materially from its 
161 Cf. LePorte 2015: 355. 
162 Cf. Freedom House 2015c: 91. 
163 Cf. Freedom House 2015c: 91. 
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control of the state. This gave it a stake in preserving the status quo, which also meant that further 
democratic and economic reforms were not in its interests”.164
5.1.2. Moldova
Table 9: Moldova: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings
Moldova is a small, land-locked former Soviet republic located in South Eastern Europe, wedged 
between Ukraine and Romania. The country has a population of roughly 3.6 million inhabitants. 
Regarding Moldova’s political system and trajectory since having gained independence from the 
Soviet Union, Lucan Way writes the following: “Moldova represents one of the most puzzling ca-
ses of pluralism in the post-communist world. Despite extreme poverty, lack of democratic histo-
ry, rural population, and low educational attainment, Moldova was more pluralistic than any other 
post-Soviet country outside of the Baltic States”.165 Explaining the counterintuitive nature of Moldo-
va’s political system during the 1990s and early 2000s, which saw two incumbent presidents leave 
office in a democratic fashion and a functioning balance of power, Way describes Moldova’s state 
as being “pluralism by default”.166 Reasons behind Moldova’s pluralism include stark divisions over 
national identity, the absence of robust rule of law, as well as the state’s institutional design.167
Similar to Azerbaijan, Moldova’s transition from a former Soviet republic to an independent coun-
try was aggravated by a separatist conflict in the eastern industrial region of Transnistria. Transni-
stria was inhabited predominantly by Russophone inhabitants, who feared a possible integration 
of Moldova with Romania. In December 1991, the Trans-Dniester Moldova Republic (PMR) held a 
referendum in which the territory agreed to succeed from Moldova. In 1992, open warfare broke 
out between Moldova and the PMR, which was supported by elements of the Russian 14th Army 
based in the region, which internationalized the conflict. A ceasefire was eventually signed in July 
1992 and the conflict remains frozen until present, similar to other “frozen conflicts” in the post-So-
viet space, including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
164 Radnitz 2012: 69. 
165 Way 2003: 454f. 
166 Pluralism by default, according to Way, refers to a situation where “the immediate source of political competition is 
not a robust civil society, strong democratic institutions, or democratic leadership but incumbent incapacity” (Ibid. 
455).
167 Cf. Tudoroiu 2015: 656.
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The state of pluralism by default in Moldova changed, temporarily, with the electoral victory of the 
Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM) in 2001. Under the leadership of Moldova’s then third presi-
dent, Vladimir Voronin (2001-2009), a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime was established in 
the post-Soviet country, which eliminated sources of pluralism and competition. Once in power, 
“the PCRM used its disciplined parliamentary majority to establish control over all major state ins-
titutions. The judiciary and the electoral authorities were packed, and the state media (still the do-
minant source of news), which had been relatively pluralist in the 1990s […] fell under full PCRM 
control”.168 The communists’ political control of Moldova would eventually come to an end in 2009. 
After elections in 2009, the PCRM was unable to secure enough votes to elect the president and 
student protests were brutally suppressed by security forces. New elections lead to the election of 
a pro-European alliance, namely the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), led by Vladimir Fiat. In 
November 2014, new parliamentary elections were held. The election was considered especially 
important regarding the future orientation of Moldova, particularly in the context of the ongoing 
Russo-Ukrainian War. The choice was between parties favoring deeper integration with the EU, and 
those calling for a more pro-Russian course and increased cooperation with the Russian-led EEU. 
Despite the importance of the vote, voter turnout reached an all-time low of 55.80 percent.169 The 
pro-Russian Party of Socialists (PSRM) was able to secure the most seats in parliament, followed by 
the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) and the communist PCRM. It would take until July 2015 for a 
new governing coalition to be formed between the PLDM and the Liberal Party. On July 27, 2015, 
Valeriu Strelet from the PLDM was confirmed as the country’s new prime minister.170
Figure 3: Moldova: Democratic Performance (1993-2014)
168 Levitsky and Way 2010: 231f. 
169 Freedom House 2015c: 438. 
170 See: RFE/RL 2015b: ‘Moldova president nominates Strelets as next prime minister’. <http://www.rferl.org/content/
moldova-nominates-strelets-as-next-prime-minister/27155531.html> (Accessed 01.08.2015).
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As the values and the trend line for Moldova’s democratic performance in Figure 3 above con-
firm, Moldova has been steadily improving its democracy rating since 1993, however with visible 
setbacks during communist rule between 2001 and 2009. Despite the progress made in terms of 
political rights and civil liberties, Moldova still occupies the grey zone between authoritarianism 
and democracy and has yet been able to move beyond a “partly free” rating by Freedom House. 
Considerable progress has been made in the area of civil liberties, as the country has received its 
highest rating in the post-Soviet period in 2010, namely “5”. However, considerable problems re-
main, especially regarding corruption and the relations between Chişinău and the separatist re-
gions of Transnistria and Găgăuzia. After recent elections, Moldova has continued on its pro-Eu-
ropean path, having signed an Association Agreement with the EU and recently become the first 
Eastern Partnership (EP) country to enter a liberalized visa regime with the EU.
5.1.3. Georgia
Table 10: Georgia: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings
Georgia is a small republic located in the Southern Caucasus Mountains on the eastern shore of 
the Black Sea. Georgia has a population of roughly 4.5 million inhabitants. Much like Moldova and 
Azerbaijan, Georgia’s transition to post-communism was significantly impaired by civil war and 
secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia declared independence from the So-
viet Union in spring 1991. Georgia’s first elected president in the post-communist period was Zvi-
ad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992), who was elected in May 1991 on a nationalist platform, pledging 
to regain control of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had both been autonomous regions 
during the Soviet period. Although Gamsakhurdia was elected with an overwhelming majority, 
obtaining 87 percent of the vote, his coalition collapsed in September 1991 and the country’s Na-
tional Guard withdrew its support of the president, leaving him without armed forces.171 A little 
more than half a year after his election, Gamaskhurdia was overthrown in a coup in early 1992. The 
victorious paramilitary groups that had ousted Gamsakhurdia were unable to impose order on the 
country and eventually invited Eduard Shevardnadze to assume the post of president. Shevard-
nadze had previously served as the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union as well as the First Secre-
171 Cf. Levitsky and Way 2010: 222. 
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tary of the Georgian Communist Party between 1972 and 1985. Describing the dire state of Geor-
gia inherited by Shevardnadze, Theodor Tudoroiu writes that the country was “little more than a 
failed state. Nearly 20 percent of its territory was beyond the central government’s control. Abk-
hazia and South Ossetia had seceded under Russian protection. Adjaria was controlled by its local 
potentate […] Since independence the country has been under constant pressure from Russia”.172 
Shevardnadze was able to impose some semblance of order on the country and end the armed 
conflicts with secessionist regions. Elections in 1995 saw Shevardnadze’s Citizen’s Union of Geor-
gia (CUG) win 107 out of 235 parliamentary seats. The vote, however, was marred by widespread 
claims of manipulation and fraud.173 Georgia under Shevardnadze has been described as a “weak 
kleptocracy”174, wracked by corruption and mismanagement. In this chaotic situation, “govern-
ment officials misappropriated international aid or helped sell off state industries to their associ-
ates. Off-the-record deals were said to account for 60-70 percent of the country’s total economic 
activity. The state could not deliver basic services, repair the crumbling infrastructure, enforce the 
law, or collect taxes”.175 
In the early 2000’s, support for Shevardnadze’s CUG dropped dramatically. Top officials and depu-
ties from the CUG began to abandon Shevardnadze, including the then Justice Minister Mikheil 
Saakashvili. The extent of the CUG’s decline was made evident in local elections in 2002, which 
saw the coalition receive just 4 percent of the vote in the capital Tbilisi.176 Massively fraudulent 
elections on November 2, 2003 led to Shevardnadze’s newly formed coalition “For a New Geor-
gia!” winning a slim majority of seats. This in turn sparked opposition protests, led by Mikheil Saa-
kashvili, which culminated in Georgia’s parliament being stormed on November 22, 2003 and the 
subsequent resignation of Shevardnadze. These events would come to be referred to as the Rose 
Revolution, which was the first of several so-called Colored Revolutions to sweep through Eura-
sia in the coming years. 
In early 2004, parliamentary elections were held and Saakashvili’s UNM obtained 96 percent of 
the vote and won circa two thirds of the seats in parliament. During his time in office, Saakash-
vili implemented various state-building measures and was able to significantly reduce endemic 
corruption in the country. However, Saakashvili was unsuccessful in institutionalizing democratic 
rule. Commenting on Saakashvili’s governing style, Levitsky and Way write that “media harass-
ment persisted, including tax raids of independent television stations, prosecution of journalists, 
and government pressure to cancel programs critical of Saakashvili […] The judiciary was packed, 
and government critics were occasionally arrested, and in a few cases, charged with treason”.177 In 
172 Tudoroiu 2007: 319. 
173 Cf. Levitsky and Way 2010: 223. 
174 Tudoroiu 2007: 319. 
175 Ibid. 319f. 
176 Cf. Levitsky and Way 2010: 224. 
177 Levitsky and Way 2010: 227. 
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2007, after the arrest of former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili on corruption charges, oppositi-
on protests broke out in the capital. Saakashvili’s government responded by violently breaking up 
the protests and declaring a state of emergency. As a result, “demonstrations were banned, priva-
te news-broadcasting was suspended, and several television states […] were taken off the air”.178 
After early elections in January 2008, which were also marred by allegations of fraud, Saakashvili 
successfully obtained a second term. 
During his time as president, 2004-2013, Mikheil Saakashvili was unable to reestablish control over 
the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Throughout 2008, tensions and provoca-
tions had been increasing between Georgia and the two breakaway regions. As August approa-
ched, the situation between South Ossetia and Georgia came to a head. On the night of 7-8 August, 
Georgian forces launched an attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.179 On the following 
morning, Georgian forces carried out a ground invasion of Tskhinvali and surrounding areas. Ge-
orgia’s moves prompted a Russian retaliatory attack.180 Georgia was unable to counter Russian ad-
vances and the conflict ended with a ceasefire negotiated by then French President Nicholas Sar-
kozy. Russia subsequently deepened its occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognized 
the two regions as independent. 
In parliamentary elections in October 2012, Saakashvili’s UNM was defeated by the opposition 
Georgian Dream (GD) coalition, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Power passing to Ivanishvi-
li marked the first orderly and democratic transfer of power in Georgia’s post-Soviet era. Saakas-
hvili’s second term expired in October 2013 and Giorgi Margvelashvili from GD became Georgia’s 
new president. Constitutional amendments also came into effect, shifting power in Georgia from 
the president to the prime minister and the parliament.181 Ivanishvili resigned as prime minister in 
November 2013, and Irakli Garibashvili become the country’s new prime minister. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Tagliavini 2009b: 209. 
180 Since the outbreak of war between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s, CIS i.e. Russian peace-
keeping forces had been stationed in the two regions. Russian forces were also killed in Georgia’s initial attack on 
Tskhinvali. The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 will be discussed in greater detail below in section 5.3. 
181 Cf. Freedom House 2015c: 248.
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Figure 4: Georgia: Democratic Performance (1993-2014)
As the values and the trend line presented above in Figure 4 show, Georgia’s democratic perfor-
mance has improved steadily since 1993, however, it has yet to reach the status of a consolidat-
ed democracy. There have also been setbacks along the way, with Georgia’s democratic perfor-
mance diminishing between 1999 and 2003 under Shevardnadze, as well as between 2006 and 
2009 under Saakashvili. Regarding the current state of civil rights and freedom of the press in Geor-
gia, Freedom House comments that “in 2014, Georgia continued, albeit slowly, to roll back some 
of the limits on civil liberties from the UNM era, but the GD government frequently complained 
about the media and civil society”.182
5.2. IV 1: The Amount of Energy Rents
5.2.1. Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is considered one of the oldest oil-producing nations in the world and a key exporter 
to the European market. Writing on the history of Azerbaijan’s oil production, Mahmoud Ghafou-
ri notes that “the Caspian fields began producing oil near Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1871 and account-
ed for half of the world’s limited production in 1900”.183 The country’s gas and oil fields continued 
to be exploited during the Soviet period, however many of these fields had begun to dry up. One 
182 Freedom House 2015c: 250. 
183 Ghafouri 2008: 82.
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of the key indigenous players in Azerbaijan’s energy industry is the “State Oil Company of the Re-
public of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The exploration and exploitation of new oil and gas fields since in-
dependence, however, has taken place primarily in cooperation with Western oil and gas com-
panies. Cooperation generally takes place within the framework of a so-called “Product Sharing 
Agreement” (PSA), two of which have become very important for Azerbaijan’s economy, namely 
the Azeri-Chirag-Güneshli oil field (ACG) as well as the Shah-Deniz gas field.184 The ACG field con-
tains roughly 5.4 billion barrels of oil and up to 70 billion cubic meters of gas and is operated by 
the consortium “Azerbaijan International Operating Company” (AIOC). British Petroleum (BP) has 
a leading stake in the consortium with 34.14%.185 In September 1994, AIOC signed a 30-year con-
tract to develop the ACG field, which was worth 8 billion US-Dollars.186 The Shah-Deniz gas field is 
estimated to contain between 400 and 700 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and it is also operat-
ed by a consortium headed by BP.187 Since entering in its first PSA in the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan has 
concluded up to 26 such agreements in total to develop its oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea.188
In order to manage the country’s energy rents and wealth, Azerbaijan established a sovereign 
wealth fund189 in 1999, called the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), which became operational 
in 2001. According to Kenan Aslanli, SOFAZ’s revenue consists of a mixture of “the proceeds from 
the sales of Azerbaijan’s share in hydrocarbons, transit fees, bonus payments, and acreage fees, 
revenues from the management of the Fund’s assets and other revenues”.190 The fund has three 
main objectives, namely to maintain macroeconomic stability and to decrease the country’s de-
pendency on oil revenues as well as to attempt to non-energy related sectors of the economy, to 
preserve oil revenues for future generations and to finance socio-economic projects.191 
Azerbaijan’s oil production in the post-Soviet period can be divided into three distinct periods. 
The first phase, between 1991 and 1996, is referred to by Hannes Meissner as the “pre-oil phase”.192 
During this period, Azerbaijan was still working oil fields which had been developed and exploit-
ed during the Soviet period. Production declined from around 222 thousand barrels a day to circa 
180 thousand barrels a day.193 During the second phase, dubbed the “early-oil phase” (1997-2005) 
by Meissner, production increased significantly, primarily due to the exploitation of the ACG field. 
Output during this phase increased from roughly 180 thousand barrels per day to 440 thousand 
per day in 2005. It was during this period that Azerbaijan became a net exporter of oil. Regarding oil 
184 Cf. Meissner 2010b: 2. 
185 Cf. Ibid. 
186 Cf. Ghafouri 2008: 83. 
187 Cf. Meissner 2010b: 2. 
188 Cf. Guliyev 2009: 4.
189 Sovereign wealth funds are “government-owned investment funds operated in private financial markets” (Aslanli 
2015: 116). 
190 Ibid. 117.
191 Cf. Ibid. 
192 Meissner 2010b: 3. 
193 Cf. Meissner 2010b: 3.
Kyle Simmons: Transition, Stagnation or Regression? 53
revenues, Meissner writes that they also experienced a dramatic rise in during the early-oil phase, 
and “not least due to rising oil prices on the world market, [they] continued to increase to around 
1.051 million U.S. dollars in 2005, reaching a level of around 1.486 million U.S. dollars in 2005”.194 
The final phase is referred appropriately as the “big oil phase”, which has been continuing since 
2006. One of the key factors affecting oil output during this period is the fact that the Baku-Tbili-
si-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC), whose construction was completed in 2005, came online in 2006. The 
1,040-mile pipeline was built by a BP-led consortium and it was projected to peak at deliveries of 
up to 1 million barrels of oil per day in 2009.195 Annual profits of up to 21 billion US-Dollars were 
expected, however due to the collapse oil prices as a result of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008 
and 2009, oil revenues only reached roughly 12 billion US-Dollars in 2009.196 In January 2014, Azer-
baijan’s proved crude oil reserves were estimated to be roughly 7 billion barrels, and its produc-
tion in 2013 was roughly 810,000 barrels of oil per day.197 According to the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA), Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports peaked in 2010 and have declined every 
year since.198
Traditionally an oil-producing nation and an importer of natural gas from Russia, Azerbaijan be-
came a net exporter of natural gas in 2007, due to production from the Shah-Deniz gas field. The 
main export route for Azerbaijani natural gas is the South Caucasus Pipeline, or the Baku-Tbili-
si-Erzurum Pipeline (BTE), which has a transit capacity of 300 billion cubic feet per year.199 Transit 
capacity is expected to increase to up to 800 billion cubic feet after upgrades to the pipeline sys-
tem in the coming years. The export of natural is expected to play an increasing important role in 
Azerbaijani commodities exports in the coming years.   
194 Ibid. 
195 Cf. Ghafouri 2008: 93.  
196 Cf. Meissner 2010b: 3. 
197 Cf. EIA 2014: 2. 
198 Cf. Ibid. 4
199 Cf. Ibid. 8.
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Figure 5: Azerbaijan: The Amount of Energy Rents (1993-2013)
Azerbaijan’s increased production of both oil and natural gas has been reflected in the yearly 
amount of energy rents the country has taken in over the previous twenty years. A dramatic increa-
se in the amount of energy rents as a percentage of GDP can be discerned on in Figure 5 above af-
ter 2005. This was the year that Azerbaijan began exploiting the ACG field. This was accompanied 
by the BTC pipeline coming online, which increased export capacity. According to data from the 
World Bank, Azerbaijan’s oil and gas rents peaked in 2006 with a combined total of 68.4 percent 
of GDP, which is more than double the energy rents accrued in 1993, at 32.7 percent. Combined 
oil and gas rents remained above 60 percent of GDP through 2008, however a steep decline took 
place in 2009 (from 65.6 percent to 43.8 percent). This was primarily due to the collapse of world 
commodity prices in light of the Global Financial Crisis. For the entire time span of this study, Azer-
baijan’s annual mean percentage of GDP derived from oil and natural gas rents was 44.92 percent. 
The overwhelming majority of energy rents were derived from the exploitation of the country’s 
bountiful oil resources, which averaged 38 percent of GDP per year. The sale and export of natural 
gas has contributed considerably less to Azerbaijan’s resource wealth, averaging circa 6 percent of 
GDP per annum. However, the role of natural gas in Azerbaijan’s economy is expected to increase 
over the coming years with the exploration and exploitation of new gas fields in the Caspian Sea. 
Regarding the effects of the energy sector on Azerbaijan’s economy, Anja Franke et al. note that 
it has “triggered certain asymmetrical development in the country: there are high growth rates 
in the oil and gas industries, while non-oil sectors have attracted little attention, and the govern-
ment has neglected to introduce policies of diversification”.200 Considering the high level of ener-
gy rents in Azerbaijan’s annual GDP, the neglect of other economic sectors as well as the fact that 
200 Franke et al. 2009: 121. 
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energy exports account for roughly 90 percent of total exports201, Azerbaijan can be considered a 
rentier state202 with a high amount of energy rents.
5.2.2. Moldova
Moldova is one of Europe’s smallest energy markets and can be considered the opposite of Azer-
baijan in terms of indigenous natural resource wealth. Describing Moldova’s overall energy situ-
ation, Agata Łoskot writes that the South-Eastern European country “has practically no domestic 
hydrocarbon resources and relies heavily on imported gas, petroleum products, [and] coal for half 
of the domestic electricity demand”.203 Moldova does, however, serve as a transit country for Rus-
sian natural gas deliveries to the Balkans as well as to Turkey. Moldova’s transit capacity for natu-
ral gas runs at circa 44 billion cubic meters per year, however its pipeline network generally is not 
utilized to its full capacity. In 2009, for example, Moldova transited around 17.9 billion cubic me-
ters of Russian natural gas to Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Western Turkey.204 The conflict be-
tween Moldova and the separatist region of Transnistria complicates Moldova’s import and transit 
of Russian natural gas. Commenting on this situation, Katja Yafimava writes that “all Russian gas 
flowing to Europa across Moldova has first to cross Transdniestria. Whereas de jure Transdniestria 
is part of the Republic of Moldova and thus exists within the framework of latter’s legal system, 
the Moldovan government de facto has no control over Transdniestrian territory, and hence can-
not enforce any laws there”.205 
Until recently, Moldova had been 100 percent dependent on Russia to cover its demand for natu-
ral gas. Russia’s energy giant Gazprom also has a 50 percent stake in Moldova’s main energy com-
pany, now the joint venture Moldovagaz, whereas the Moldovan state owns 35.33 of the company 
and the separatist region Transnistria owns 1.23 percent.206 In April of this year, a pipeline between 
Romania and Moldova, the Iasi-Ungheni Pipeline, became operational after construction was com-
pleted in 2014. The pipeline is currently delivering around 1 million cubic meters of natural gas to 
Western parts of Moldova, which is enough to serve 10,300 consumers. However, there are plans 
to extend the pipeline to the capitol city Chişinău and expand its transit capacity to 1.5 billion cu-
bic meters per year, which would be sufficient to meet Moldova’s yearly demand for natural gas.207 
The aim of the pipeline is to try to reduce Moldova’s dependency on Russian gas deliveries and to 
201 Cf. EIA 2014: 1. 
202 This assessment is based on Mahdavy’s classification of a rentier state presented above, which stipulates that a par-
ticular country can be considered a rentier state when it receives “on a regular basis substantial amounts of exter-
nal rent” (Mahdavy 1970: 428). 
203 Łoskot 2008: 311. 
204 Cf. Yafimava 2011: 262. 
205 Ibid. 264.
206 Ibid. 
207 Cf. Government of Republic of Moldova 2015: ‘Moldova starts gas imports from Romania’ <http://www.mec.gov.
md/en/content/moldova-starts-gas-imports-romania> (Accessed 01.08.2015). 
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diversify their sources. 
Moldova does possess very small crude oil reserves, however they are not sufficiently plentiful to 
cover the country’s demand.208 Moldova relies primarily on Russia and, to a lesser extent, Roma-
nia to cover its need for petroleum products. In 2005, Moldova opened its first oil refinery in Com-
rat, however the facility is very small does not play a significant role in Moldova’s domestic mar-
ket for oil products.209
Figure 6: Moldova: The Amount of Energy Rents (1993-2013)
Since having gained independence, energy rents have played a miniscule role in Moldova’s percen-
tage of GDP, as displayed in Figure 6 above. According to data provided by the World Bank’s Wor-
ld Development Indicators, Moldova has accrued no natural gas rents since 1993. Oil rents have 
been almost equally non-existent, peaking at 0.2% of GDP in 2008. These rents are likely due to 
Moldova’s modest production of refined petroleum products and their export.210 Between 1993 
and 2013, energy rents made up, on average, circa 0.047% of Moldova’s GDP. Moldova can there-
fore be categorized as a non-rentier state with a low amount of energy rents.
208 The CIA World Factbook puts Moldova’s proven crude oil reserves at 7,330 barrels. <https://www.cia.gov/library/pu-
blications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html> (Accessed 01.08.2015).
209 Cf. Łoskot 2008: 314.
210 According to the CIA World Factbook, Moldova produced roughly 321 barrels of refined petroleum products per 
day in 2012, and exported 552 barrels per day. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
md.html> (Accessed 01.08.2015).
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5.3. IV 2: The Degree of Russian External Leverage 
5.3.1. Georgia
Due to the interwoven nature of Russia’s military, political and economic levers in Georgia, they will 
not be presented in successive order. Out of the six countries included in this study, Georgia has 
been subject to the highest degree of external Russian leverage. This is particularly true regard-
ing the three military levers included in the analysis, namely “Military Interventions”, “Military Bas-
es” and “Peacekeeping Forces”. Firstly, Georgia received a “High” rating for “Military Interventions” 
due to the fact that Russia has intervened militarily in its South Caucasian neighbor both during 
the 1990s as well as in the brief 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. 
Russia’s first interventions in Georgia occurred during early 1990s, in the chaotic context of the 
Georgian Civil War, as well as armed conflicts between the Georgian state and the secessionist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. War between Georgia and South Ossetia commenced in 
December 1990, and war between Abkhazia and Georgia began almost two years later, in Au-
gust 1992. In this chaotic situation, Russian presented itself as a power willing to foster peace and 
stability in its near abroad. However, rather than acting as an honest broker in its neighbor’s tu-
multuous wars, “Russia has appeared to exploit the chaos in Georgia to the point where the inde-
pendence-seeking Georgian state has been forced into the CIS and Moscow has assured Russia’s 
continued military presence in the country”.211  
Russian assistance to Abkhazia, including troops, weapons and even airstrikes, was instrumental 
in the breakaway region’s defeat of the Georgian army. Complicating matters even further for Edu-
ard Shevardnadze, supporters of ousted president Gamsakhurdia launched a simultaneous rebel-
lion against the president in the western province of Samegrelo. At this stage, Shevardnadze asked 
Moscow for assistance in putting down the rebellion, but Russian help came with a price, name-
ly “the re-orientation of Georgia’s foreign policy”.212 Georgia subsequently joined the CIS in 1993 
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1994, which was under Russian control. 
These developments bear directly on the second military lever, namely “Military Bases”, rated as 
“High” in Georgia. As part of the agreement on Russian assistance in Georgia’s civil war, four Rus-
sian military bases in Georgia213 dating back to the Soviet period were to be maintained by Rus-
sian soldiers. Russian border troops were also introduced along Georgia’s borders with Turkey and 
along its Black Sea coast. Considering the strategic location of Russian military bases throughout 
its territory, “Georgia not only lost its territorial integrity de facto, but partially also its sovereign-
211 Hill and Jewett 1994: 45.
212 Tagliavini 2009b: 5.
213 Russia’s military bases in Georgia were located in: Batumi (Adjara), Gudauta (Abkhazia), Akhalkalaki (Samtskhe-Ja-
vakheti) and Vaziani (near Tbilisi). 
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ty”.214 Russian border troops would remain in Georgia until 1999. Russia’s four military bases would 
not be vacated until 2007, after years of negotiations. 
Russia’s involvement in Georgia’s various armed conflicts during the early 1990s also has direct 
bearing on the third military lever, namely “Peacekeeping Forces”, rated “High”. Russia was instru-
mental in brokering the ceasefires in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unlike in the war in Abkha-
zia, Russia played no discernable role in the hostilities in South Ossetia. Russia did, however, actively 
pressure Georgia215 to accept Russian peacekeepers in order to end the fighting in the breakaway 
region, which threatened to spill over into North Ossetia in Russia. Russia took advantage of the 
conflict by forcing an agreement on Georgia in June 1992 and subsequently moving peacekeep-
ers into the region in July, which gave Russia “its first permanent foothold in Georgia and initiated 
the first stage of the country’s dismemberment”.216 In the case of Abkhazia, rebels launched an of-
fensive in September 1993, which Georgia was unable to resist, while Russian feigned neutrality. 
Gamsakhurdia’s simultaneous rebellion only further weakened Shevardnadze’s position, who was 
in serious jeopardy of being overthrown. It was only after agreeing to join the CIS in October 1993 
that Russia came to Georgia’s assistance. After a ceasefire was signed in 1994, Russian peacekeep-
ing operations, including roughly 3,000 Russian soldiers, began in Abkhazia in June 1994. Russia’s 
saving of Shevardnadze’s government “essentially produced a compliant government in the most 
anti-Russian region of the former Soviet Union. It was a clever manoeuver in the longer term ef-
fort to secure Georgia’s commitment to reintegration with Russia”.217
The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia played a key role in 
Russia’s second military intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Throughout the summer of 2008, 
tensions had been rising between Georgia and both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A series of prov-
ocations and what amounted to a low-intensity war between Georgia and South Ossetia contin-
ued to escalate and eventually spun out of control. On the night of August 7-8, Georgian forces 
launched a major attack on the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali. This attack was followed by a 
ground invasion of Tskhinvali and surrounding areas in the early morning hours of August 8. Geor-
gia’s advance would, however, soon be halted by Russian armed forces. During Georgia’s assault 
on South Ossetia, Russian peacekeeping forces were killed, which was used by Russia as a pretext 
to enter the conflict. Regarding Russia’s counter attack, the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia states the following: 
214 Tagliavini 2009b: 5. 
215 Regarding Russia’s pressure exerted on Georgia to allow Russia to end the conflict, Dmitri Trenin writes that “Geor-
gia was warned of grave political, economic and military consequences in case it did not stop its attacks on Zkhin-
vali: the Russian parliament would grant the South Ossetian request of joining Russia; sanctions would be imposed 
and Tbilisi itself […] could be bombed” (Trenin 1995: 135).
216 Hill and Jewett 1994: 48. 
217 Hill and Jewett 1994: 60.
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In a counter-movement, Russian armed forces, covered by air strikes and elements from the 
Black Sea fleet, penetrated deep into Georgia, cutting across the country’s main east-west 
road, reaching the port of Poti and stopping short of Georgia’s capital city, Tbilisi. The con-
frontation developed into a combined inter-state and intra-state conflict, opposing Georgi-
an and Russian forces at one level of confrontation as well as South Ossetians together with 
Abkhaz fighters and the Georgians at another.218    
A ceasefire was eventually negotiated on August 12 between the Russian President Dmitri Med-
vedev, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the French President Nikolas Sarkozy. In the 
aftermath of the conflict, Russia cemented its positions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
eventually recognized both regions as being independent of Georgia. Russia maintains circa 5,000 
troops in Abkhazia and around 3,000 troops in South Ossetia.219 
With the exception of the political lever “Multilateral Organizations Dominated by Russia”, Geor-
gia received high ratings for the variable’s political levers, including “Support of anti-Western Go-
vernments/Opposition to pro-Western Governments” and “Support of Secessionist Republics”. As 
mentioned above, Russia has pursued a policy of “managed instability” regarding Georgia. This 
was especially the case after the Rose Revolution in 2003 and the election of pro-Western politi-
cian Mikheil Saakashvili, who was interested in increasing Georgia’s integration with the West, in-
cluding membership in EU and NATO. According to the Russian point of view, “the ouster of She-
vardnadze was not a genuinely democratic event, but a plot orchestrated by Western powers to 
isolate and encircle Russia”.220 
With regards to the first political lever, Russia has both supported and opposed regimes in Georgia 
at different times, at a high level. As outlined above, Russia intervened and offered military sup-
port to Georgia in its war against Abkhaz fighters and anti-government rebels after Shevardnadze 
agreed to integrate Georgia into Russian-led political and military organizations, as well as to the 
stationing of Russian troops on Georgian territory. After 2004, Russia adopted a much more antag-
onistic stance towards Georgia and sought to oppose its new government. Initially, Russia’s opposi-
tion to Georgia took the form of energy sanctions, linked to the economic lever “Energy Monopoly”, 
as well as trade embargos, which is also an economic lever (“Trade Embargos”). Regarding Russia’s 
energy monopoly, Georgia has a medium level of dependency on Russia221, however, before the 
BTC pipeline from Azerbaijan came online in 2008, Georgia was heavily reliant on Russia for natural 
gas deliveries. Russia exploited this dependency in order to punish the Georgian government po-
litically. Commenting on this situation, Randall Newnham writes that “as with other defiant ex-So-
218 Tagliavini 2009a: 10.
219 See: Rukhadze 2013: ‘Russia underscores its military presence in Georgia’s breakaway regions’  <http://www.james-
town.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40952&no_cache=1#.VczM__ntmkp> (Accessed: 25.07.2015). 
220 Karagiannis 2014: 403. 
221 Cf. Balmaceda 2013: 24. 
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viet states, Georgia was subjected to massive gas price increases. From 2004 to 2006 the price de-
manded by Gazprom, the Russian state gas monopoly, increased by nearly 500 percent, from $50 
to $235 per thousand cubic meters”.222 Georgia has also experienced a high level of trade embar-
gos from Russia. After a ring of Russian spies was discovered and expelled from Georgia in 2006, 
Russia retaliated with trade embargos of Georgian wine, mineral water, fruits and vegetables. Con-
sidering Georgia’s economic dependency on the Russian market, its economy was detrimentally 
affected.223 The embargoes were subsequently lifted after the GD coalition came to power in 2014. 
The political lever “Support of Secessionist Republics”, was also rated as “High”. Russia’s involvement 
in the breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s and in 2008 have already been 
extensively documented above. In addition to recognizing the two regions as independent in Au-
gust 2008, Russia also distributed Russian passports to inhabitants, thus further strengthening its 
hold there. Regarding the political lever “Multilateral Organizations Dominated by Russia”, Georgia 
received a low rating. Between 1993 and 2008, Georgia was a member of the Russian lead CIS and 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, after the war with Russia in 2008, Geor-
gia exited the CIS. Georgia was briefly a member of the CSTO from 1994 to 1999. 
5.3.2. Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan has been subjected to the lowest amount of Russian external leverage throughout the 
time span of this study. With regards to IV 2’s three military levers, Azerbaijan received a rating of 
“Low” for both “Military Interventions” and “Peacekeeping Forces”, while obtaining a rating of “Me-
dium” for “Military Bases”. Between 1993 and 2014, Azerbaijan experienced no Russian military in-
terventions on its soil. For this reason, Azerbaijan received a low rating for “Military Interventions”. 
There have also been no instances of Azerbaijan having Russian peacekeepers present on its terri-
tory since 1993, which resulted in a low rating for this military lever. Azerbaijan was given the rating 
“Medium” for the lever “Military Bases” due to the fact that it hosted a Russian radar station in Ga-
bala. The facility was built during the Soviet period and was used to monitor any possible ballistic 
missile launches emanating from the Middle East region. Russia leased the base from Azerbaijan 
from 2002 to 2012, paying the host country 7 million USD per year. As the lease was set to expire 
in 2012, negotiations were undertaken to extend Russia’s lease of the facility. However, Azerbai-
jan reportedly increased the radar station’s rent to $300 million USD per year, which in turn caused 
Russia to abandon the facility.224 With the early-warning radar facility at Armavir in the Krasnodar 
region of Russia, Gabala had also become redundant for Russia. 
222 Newnham 2015: 164. 
223 As Newnham notes, “The Russian import restrictions not only not only impacted Georgia’s overall trade balance […] 
They specifically impacted sectors which previously had depended on the Russian market. Before the boycotts, for 
example, Georgia had sent 80-90% of its wine exports to Russia” (Ibid. 166).
224 Cf. Herszenhorn 2012: ‘Russia to close radar station in Azerbaijan’ <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/eu-
rope/russia-to-shut-down-radar-station-in-azerbaijan.html?_r=0> (Accessed 05.08.2015). 
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Relative to other post-Soviet states, Russia has a limited capacity to influence the political trajec-
tory of Azerbaijan. Commenting on this situation, Shahin Abbasov writes that “Moscow has lim-
ited levers with which to exert political or economic pressure on Baku. Unlike other former Sovi-
et republics, Azerbaijan contains no large ethnic Russian minority, hosts no Russian military bases 
and has no Russian-controlled economic assets that could give Moscow political influence”.225  For 
the political levers “Support of anti-Western Governments/Opposition to pro-Western Governments”, 
Azerbaijan received a rating of “Low”. Azerbaijan has successfully diversified both its political and 
economic ties to both regional countries as well as members of the EU. In terms of economic re-
lations, the EU accounts for up to 42 percent of Azerbaijan’s overall trade, while trade with states 
from the Russian-led EEU only makes up less than 10 percent of the country’s foreign trade.226 Fur-
thermore, in the area of security policy, Azerbaijan has bought advanced military hardware from 
Israel and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with Turkey, which is a member of NA-
TO.227 Further deepening its regional ties, Azerbaijan and Iran have agreed to set up a joint mech-
anism for dealing with defense challenges. Iran has also offered to sale weapons to Azerbaijan, a 
proposal which is being considered by Baku.228
Azerbaijan received a rating of “Medium” for the political lever “Support of Secessionist Repub-
lics”, due to the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which continues to claim both Azeri and Ar-
menian lives. Regarding Russia’s role in the decades old conflict, Neil Melvin from SIPRI writes the 
following: 
As the conflict progressed, a Russian position gradually emerged, focused on support for 
Armenia as a key ally in the Caucasus. Military aid; the basing of Russian troops in Armenia; 
an expansion of Russian-owned business into the republic; and the inclusion of Armenia wi-
thin Russian integration projects, became the central planks of Russia’s southern Caucasus 
policy. From Armenia’s standpoint, its security relationship with Russia has become even 
more important as Azerbaijan has built up its military forces.229
Fierce clashes erupted along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh in summer of 2014. The fight-
ing was some of the heaviest in recent years and included heavy weaponry and led to the death 
of up to 20 combatants.230 Despite having supported the Armenian side in the conflict, Russia has 
recently been selling weapons to both sides in the conflict, including an arms deal with Azerbaijan 
225 See:  Abbasov 2014: ‘Azerbaijan avoids Moscow’s embrace’ <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68701> (Accessed 
04.08.2015).
226 See: Ibid. 
227 See: Agayev 2014: ‘Putin stirs Azeri angst that Russia is set to extend sway’ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2014-04-06/putin-stirs-azeri-angst-russia-will-seek-to-extend-sway> (Accessed: 02.08.2015). 
228 See: Lomsadze 2015: ‘Iran offers guns and friendship to Azerbaijan’ <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73071> (Ac-
cessed: 10.08.2015). 
229 Melvin 2014: ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: The not so frozen conflict’ <http://russialist.org/nagorno-karabakh-the-not-so-fro-
zen-conflict/> (Accessed: 05.08.2015).
230 Cf. Ibid. 
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worth 4 billion USD in 2014.231 Regarding the final political lever “Multilateral Organizations Dom-
inated by Russia”, Azerbaijan received a rating of “Medium”. The medium rating is due to the fact 
that Azerbaijan remains a member of the CIS. It was previously a member of the CSTO, however it 
exited the military alliance in 1999, after having joined in 1994. 
Considering Azerbaijan’s vast energy wealth has been described extensively above in section 5.2.1, 
it will not be repeated here. Given the country’s strong position regarding indigenous energy re-
sources, Azerbaijan received a rating “Low” for the economic lever “Energy Monopoly”.  The coun-
try also received a rating of “Low” for the economic lever “Trade Embargos”, since no significant 
trade embargos have been imposed on the country by Russia during the time span of this study.
231 Cf. Melvin 2014. 
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6. Discussion of the Results
In this section, the results of the empirical test of the study’s two hypotheses will be presented 
and analyzed. The hypotheses were derived from the literature on the rentier state theory as well 
as the scholarly debate on autocracy promotion. They were tested to determine their explanatory 
power regarding the deficiencies in democratic performance in the post-Soviet states located on 
the EU’s eastern periphery, namely in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. 
IV 1, which postulated a negative relationship between the level of energy rents at a government’s 
disposal and its democratic performance, has been confirmed in this study. The two cases selected 
to test this hypothesis were Azerbaijan and Moldova, as they were the cases with the highest and 
lowest values on the side of the IV, respectively. Azerbaijan is by far the most resource-rich coun-
try examined in this study. Along with the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states in the 
Caspian region, Azerbaijan is considered a post-Soviet rentier state par excellence. Discernable ele-
ments of the rentier state theory have been observable in Azerbaijan over the past two decades, 
including both the rentier effect and the repression effect. Commenting on the “spending effect”, 
which is a part of the “rentier effect”, Dayne Lukas Shaw writes that “this paradigm has emerged 
in Azerbaijan; patronage and corruption are core characteristics of the regime. It has permeated 
down from the Presidency to the lowest levels of the bureaucracy”.  In terms of the “repression ef-
fect”, Azerbaijan spends a vast amount of its GDP on military and security services, which is “faci-
litated by rents derived from natural resources”. 
Throughout the time span of this study, the percentage of energy rents in Azerbaijan’s GDP drop-
ped below 30 percent only one time, namely in 1998, which was likely due to the Russian econo-
mic crisis and its knock-on effects in the region. Azerbaijan’s energy rents as a percentage of GDP 
peaked between 2005 and 2008, topping out at 68.4 percent of GDP in 2006, and falling below 40 
percent for the first time again in 2013. Regarding Azerbaijan’s democratic performance, the co-
untry experienced minimal changes in its status as an “unfree” authoritarian state between 1993 
and 2014. Due to modest liberalizations in civil liberties carried out by Alieyev senior, Azerbaijan 
received the Freedom House status of “partially free” from 1997 to 2002. However, following the 
transfer of power to Ilham Aliyev in 2003, Azerbaijan’s civil liberty ratings have continued to dimi-
nish, and Azerbaijan’s current political rights and civil liberties ratings are the exact as they were in 
1993, however with a continuing downward trajectory.  This downward trajectory is due to Azer-
baijan’s recent crackdown on independent media and NGOs. 
Moldova, on the other hand, is an example of a resource poor country in the post-Soviet space, in 
which energy rents from point resources such as natural gas or oil have little to no relevance for 
the country’s GDP. At their highest levels, the percentage of energy rents in the country’s GDP pe-
aked at the miniscule level of .2% of GDP in 2008. For the first ten years of this study, 1993 to 2003, 
Moldova accrued no income from natural gas or oil rents, according to the World Bank. Moldova’s 
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democratic performance improved from a rating of “3” in 1993 to “5” in 2013, which saw the co-
untry move from the lower end of the status “partially free” to the higher end, however it remains 
a hybrid regime. 
IV 2, which postulated that the higher the degree of external influence Russia exerts on a country, 
the lower its democratic performance, was not confirmed in this study. The two cases selected to 
test this hypothesis were Georgia and Azerbaijan. Of the six countries included in this study, Geo-
rgia was subjected to the highest degree of Russian external influence, whereas Azerbaijan was 
confronted with the least amount. In both cases, the hypothesis was unable to successfully explain 
the development of the respective country’s democratic performance. Drawing upon the relevant 
literature on autocracy promotion in the post-Soviet space, Russia is categorized as a “black knight”, 
i.e. a negative external actor in the post-Soviet space.  The external Russian leverage which was 
exerted against Georgia during the study’s time frame ranged from numerous military interven-
tions, the stationing of peacekeepers in breakaway regions and the recognition of said regions as 
independent political entities, to trade embargos, energy sanctions and other measures meant to 
destabilize the political situation there. Russia’s treatment of Georgia can be understood within 
the policy aim of managed instability, through which Russia attempts to destabilize Western-o-
riented regimes in its near abroad with the hope of achieving regime change and a political tra-
jectory more in line with its interests. However, despite Russian meddling, or possibly as a result of 
it, Georgia’s democratic performance improved from a rating of “3” in 1993 to a “5” in 2014, which 
represents a trajectory moving from the lower end of the “partially free” status to its upper limits. 
With its vast oil and natural gas resources and lack of a significant Russian diaspora, Russian mili-
tary bases or peacekeepers, Russia has considerably less leverage over Azerbaijan than other po-
st-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. However, despite its lack of influen-
ce, Azerbaijan saw little to no positive development in its democratic performance between 1993 
and 2014. Azerbaijan’s democratic performance received a rating of “2” in 1993, and despite a brief 
period of liberalization in the late 1990s and the obtainment of the status “partially free”, Azerba-
ijan’s democratic performance diminished over the previous decade and half, and is currently ra-
ted as “2”, however with a further downward tendency. In this context, Azerbaijan has remained 
an “unfree” authoritarian regime, despite the absence of Russian leverage exerted on other post-
-Soviet states. If the hypothesis had been correct, one would have expected Azerbaijan to have 
achieved improvements in its democratic performance over the past 20 years. 
The fact that IV 2 was not confirmed and that Georgia’s democratic performance improved despite 
significant Russian leverage over the country is, however, in line with the results of other studies 
on Russia’s role in promoting autocracy in the post-Soviet space. One such study was conducted 
by Laure Delcour and Katatryna Wolczuk in their 2014 article ‘Spoiler or facilitator of democrati-
zation? Russia’s role in Georgia and Ukraine’. Delcour and Wolczuk stress the fact that many stu-
dies have focused simply on the negative effects of Russia’s attempts to destabilize countries in 
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its neighborhood and subvert democratization. In this context, the two authors note that “by em-
phasizing the spoiling effects, the literature omits the positive (though unintended) effect of Rus-
sia’s actions on strengthening democracy in the ‘contested neighborhood’”.  Explaining the me-
chanisms underlying Russia’s unintended and counter intuitive strengthening of the democratic 
performance of countries it seeks to undermine, Delcour and Wolczuk conclude that “such effects 
occur because Russia’s initiatives to undermine [Georgia and Ukraine’s] statehood actually we-
aken linkages and reduce the regional power’s leverage over domestic elite and societies. In fact, 
Russia’s actions have united the national elites and population (outside the ‘breakaway’ regions) 
around sovereignty, democracy, and integration with the West”.  Despite Russia’s efforts, a broad 
consensus regarding further Western integration has persisted in Georgia, as well as in Ukraine.  
In his 2015 article ‘The limits of autocracy promotion: The case of Russia in the “near abroad”’, Lu-
can Way comes to a similar conclusion as Delcour and Wolczuk. Way stresses the need to distin-
guish between authoritarian governments which promote non-democratic regimes supportive 
of their geopolitical agenda and “the promotion of authoritarianism as such”.  Regarding Russia’s 
opposition to Georgia under president Mikheil Saakashvili and the eventual democratic transfer 
of power in 2013 which brought in political forces more accommodating to Russia, Way observes 
that “while it is possible that Russia somehow influenced these outcomes, this turnover augured 
an important milestone in Georgian democracy: the first peaceful transfer of governmental po-
wer. Georgia’s Freedom House score became more, rather than less democratic in 2012 and 2013”. 
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7. Conclusion
The goal of this study was to investigate the question as to why some post-Soviet states in Eastern 
Europe and the Southern Caucasus have only made modest gains in democratic performance sin-
ce the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while others have stagnated or undergone authoritarian re-
gressions. In order to address this question, a small-N comparative study was carried out using a 
positivist research design and methodology. As a first step in this study, the theoretical underpin-
ning of the DV, namely democratic performance, was presented along with the definitions of key 
terms. In the following step, the variable’s conceptualization and operationalization were explained. 
Next, an overview of the scholarly debate of democratization was offered. It was from this debate 
that the theoretical underpinning of the study’s two IVs was derived. The two theoretical appro-
aches to explaining the democratic performance of states in the post-Soviet space included the 
scholarly debates of both the rentier state theory as well as the more recent literature on autocra-
cy promotion. In order to test the explanatory power of these two approaches, two hypotheses 
were developed and subsequently tested. The hypothesis for IV 1 was as follows: The higher the 
amount of energy rents, the lower the democratic performance. The hypothesis for IV 2 postula-
ted the following: The higher the degree of Russian external leverage, the lower the democratic 
performance. The time frame of the empirical study encompassed 1993 to 2014, in order to cap-
ture the entire range of developments which have taken place in the post-Soviet space following 
independence. The case studies which showed the greatest variation on the side of the IV were 
chosen for the empirical tests of the hypotheses. This lead to the selection of Azerbaijan (high) and 
Moldova (low) for IV 1, and Georgia (high) and Azerbaijan (low) for IV 2.
 As a result of the empirical test, the hypothesis for IV 1, which connected higher amounts of ener-
gy rents with lower democratic performance, was confirmed. The rentier state theory proved to 
be a useful explanation for the low democratic performance of Azerbaijan, which, on average, de-
rives circa 45% of its GDP from oil and natural gas rents. Moldova, for which oil and gas rents play 
a negligible role in its GDP, persistently improved its democratic performance over the course of 
the study’s time frame. 
The hypothesis for IV 2, which postulated that a higher degree of Russian external leverage wo-
uld lead to a lower democratic performance, was falsified. Georgia, which was subjected to the hi-
ghest degree of Russian external leverage between 1993 and 2014, improved its democratic per-
formance from the low to the high end of the “partially free” status (“3” to “5”). Azerbaijan, on the 
other hand, which experienced the lowest amount of Russian external leverage, maintained a low 
democratic performance throughout the time span of this study, ending with the same rating, “2”, 
and status, “unfree”, as in 1993. While it may appear counterintuitive, this study, along with others, 
have shown that Russia’s policy of managed instability and its undermining of regimes in its “near 
abroad” which oppose its geopolitical aims, sometimes has the unintended consequence of streng-
Kyle Simmons: Transition, Stagnation or Regression? 67
thening elite and public opinion regarding deeper integration with the West in the afflicted coun-
tries. Delcour and Wolczuk (2014) have shown similar outcomes in Ukraine, while Lucan Way (2015) 
has described similar processes taking place in both Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. Regarding Azerba-
ijan’s democratic development, the rentier state theory proved to have sufficiently more explana-
tory power than Russian external influence. 
Given the unintended results of Russia’s attempts to negatively influence the democratic perfor-
mance of neighboring states and their intention to pursue integration with the West, further re-
search on both the negative and positive effects of external actors on regime change could re-
present a useful contribution to the current debate surrounding autocracy promotion and “black 
knights”, i.e. negative external actors. This study did experience some difficulties, in particular with 
regards to empirical data for IV 1. Drawing upon Roland Götz’s operationalization of energy rents, 
this study also wanted to include the transit rents as a percentage of GDP for the operationaliza-
tion of IV 1. Transit rents are particularly relevant for Belarus and Ukraine, as well as Moldova and 
Georgia, however to a lesser extent. The inclusion of transit rents in the operationalization of IV 
1 would have provided a more accurate picture regarding the percentage of GDP derived from 
energy rents in the post-Soviet space, however, due to the time constraints and a lack of reliable 
sources, transit rents had to be omitted from the analysis.
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